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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the January 25, 2011 revolution, the Police reform has been an important 
priority on the political agenda in Egypt. Human rights violations, as well as the 
mediocre police performance presented good argument for the necessity of the 
reform. However, after the June 30, 2013 political change, the demands of police 
reform were less vocal, and the argument of the war on terror became a priority. This 
was the interest of this thesis entitled "Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt's 
Changing Political Environment" submitted by Rabha Allam and supervised by Dr. 
Amr Hamzawy at the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American 
University in Cairo. The thesis addressed the question of the relation between the 
police reform and the changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 
2015. And to answer this question, it introduced the experiences of four countries 
which conducted police reform through changing political environments such as 
Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. It also relied on 22 in-depth interviews with 
police officers and human rights advocates to assess the extent of the introduced 
reform and the prospects of any potential reform. The police reform was 
conceptualized and operationalized through four main norms of democratic policing 
which are political neutrality, de-militarization, professionalism and accountability. 
Although, the Egyptian case failed on the political neutrality and the de-militarization 
levels, it proved partial success on the professionalism and the accountability levels. 
The thesis concluded to admit a positive relation between the police reform and the 
democratic political change, and also the interdependency between the four norms of 
police reform.  Egypt might have missed the chance to adopt a radical reform as in 
Poland or in South Africa but still can be inspired by the Brazilian and the Turkish 
model.  
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altaftīsh: Inspection  
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I. Introduction 
After the January 25
th
 2011 revolution in Egypt, many voices have risen to demand 
the reform of the police apparatus whose brutality was an essential reason for the 
masses to revolt. On the other hand, the complete collapse of the ministry of interior 
(MOI) after several days of attempting to suppress demonstrations has added more 
significance to the reform demands. For, the MOI was unable to function 
professionally under pressure for consecutive days. Right after the revolution, the 
debate regarding the police reform was quite clear about its mandatory nature. But, 
few months later, the reform debate has substantially faded. It has rather transformed 
into strong statements about preserving security, postponing reforms and regaining the 
state's prestige as well as the priority for countering terrorism. 
Despite the fast changes that occurred in the Egyptian political environment in the 
last four years, only one constant prevails, the human rights violations conducted by 
the police
1
. Thus, the police reform seemed to be a seasonal priority that shows up on 
the agenda when the violations rates go up. Hence, this study aims at contributing to 
the Egyptian debate about the police reform from an academic perspective and to 
reflect on its relation to the political change. The Egyptian literature concerning the 
topic is actually very few. Thereby, this study is an attempt to add to the literature by 
linking the Egyptian experience to other similar international experiences. It is also an 
attempt to clarify the prospects and the conditions of the police reform in the changing 
political environment in Egypt since 2011. In addition, this study aims at informing 
the policy makers about the main challenges of the police reform, the favorable 
conditions to overcome them, as well as the potential actors in this process. Despite 
the diversity of the actors involved in the police-reform debate, their respective 
impacts on the actual reforms introduced have not been the same. Certainly, the 
different attempts at police reform have been affected by political context and balance 
of power. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relation between the police reform 
and the changing political environment to determine the favorable context to promote 
the police reform agenda. It is also investigating how police reform was managed in 
Egypt between 2011 and 2015. The main idea is to assess the degree to which the 
                                                           
1
 For more details see the Human Rights Watch, "the World Report", Egypt, for the years 2012, 2013, 
2014  
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democratic policing norms were applied and how they possibly could be introduced 
and applied in the Egyptian context. 
In the following sections, the methodology of the study is explained followed by 
the conceptualization and the operationalization of the police reform. Then, the related 
international and local literature is extensively reviewed. Afterwards, four 
international cases of police reforms are presented to specify the political context, the 
major drivers and actors of the reform, as well as its substantial challenges. After that, 
the Egyptian case is examined to assess the reform experience in the changing political 
environment between 2011 and 2015. Then finally, the study suggests a bunch of 
policy recommendations on police reform customized to the Egyptian context.        
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II. Methodology 
In order to answer the previously mentioned research question, the study rests on a 
variety of literature concerning police reform on the theoretical and the practical 
levels. First, the theoretical literature was extremely important in determining the 
analytical framework within which police reform is conceptualized and 
operationalized. Police reform was extensively tackled in the international literature to 
describe the defining norms and criteria of democratic policing. Four main norms 
were quite important to this study, which are police political neutrality, police 
demilitarization, police professionalism and police accountability.  
Concerning the practical literature, four case studies were examined to determine 
the relation between the police reform and the changing political context. 
Accordingly, Brazil and Turkey stand as cases of gradual police reform where the 
changing political context consolidated democracy on the long term. However, Poland 
and South Africa give an example of radical police reform in a wider context of 
political change on the short term. Then the Egyptian literature was quite informative 
about the evolution of the police reform and its relation to the change in the political 
environment especially in the last four years. 
Beside the local literature, the study relies for the Egyptian case on 22 in-depth 
interviews with 11 police officers (including three former officers) and 11 human 
rights experts. The interviews, conducted in February and March 2015, were based on 
the snowball non-random sampling technique. This sampling technique was chosen 
due to some police officers having neither the ability nor the willingness to discuss 
reforming their apparatus. Some officers were reluctant to talk to a stranger (the 
researcher), others found it inappropriate to talk about police problems with a non-
officer, while others simply lacked any ideas to discuss. Moreover, it was quasi-
impossible to apply a random sampling since police officer registers are inaccessible 
for researchers. Moreover, the general environment of political tension and the several 
terrorist attacks targeting police forces made it extremely difficult to gain the trust of 
the officers. Therefore, I approached the police officers through liaisons in order to 
gain their trust and consent to conduct the interviews. Although, I had several 
connections to higher ranks in the police, I have not contacted them about this study 
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fearing there unwelcoming reaction. For, by the time of conducting this study the 
ministry of interior was not open to criticism or objective analysis regarding its 
performance in the middle of the war on terror. 
As for the human rights activists, the sample included several authors who have 
written some of the most important studies about security sector reform in Egypt, as 
well as activists who have taken part in police-reform initiatives in the last few years. 
Some of these human rights experts and activists recommended officers/former 
officers for interviews. The sample included eight police officers. Their ranks are as 
follows: two molazīm awwál, three naqīb, and one rā'id, muqadim and 'aqīd, 
respectively. Of the three former officers, at the time of their retirements two had the 
rank of naqīb and the other had the rank of 'aqīd. Thus, the sample includes two 
molazem awaal, five naqīb, two 'aqīd and one rā'id and muqadim each. Only one of 
the police officers agreed to meet me in person.  Most of them (eight) preferred 
telephone interviews while two wanted to conduct their interviews through 
emails/online texting. But I met all the human rights activists and experts in person, 
except for one who was living in another governorate at the time. These interviewees 
were affiliated with universities, research centers, NGO institutions; two hold PhDs, 
three have Master’s degrees, while the others were either activists or journalists. As 
for gender representation, only two respondents were females, from the experts' 
category. The interviews were conducted following the instructions of the IRB of the 
American University in Cairo. The interviewees were fully informed about the 
purpose and the details of the study, before giving their written consent. Almost all of 
the police officers were reluctant to sign by their real names, rather preferred to write 
alternative names. This was also the case of three only from the human rights 
advocates' category.   
The sample is extremely limited; I admit that only 11 officers/former officers 
can’t determine the opinions of around 39,000 officers nationwide. Similarly, only 11 
human rights advocates cannot represent the views of all human rightists in Egypt. 
The snowball non-random technique might also have limitations; it cannot be 
representative of the views of all officers. People belonging to the same network or 
who are related to each other in any way might share the same views concerning 
police reform. But for the exploratory nature of this study, such a sample can be 
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deemed satisfactory as a beginning. Nevertheless, this limitation is complemented/ 
triangulated by the local literature covering the evolution of the police status between 
2011 and 2015. This study tries to identify the common ground in the police officers 
and human rights activists' views in order to recommend a balanced policy for police 
reform. Moreover, by transferring the police officers' views to the human rights 
activists and vice versa, the study has a semi participatory purpose aiming to break the 
ice between two groups that seem to be antagonist. Yet, their views are 
complementary to design a balanced reform policy. For, incorporating the inputs of 
these two groups was essential to draw realistic strategies and successfully implement 
them in many countries that experienced police reform. 
The research question in this regard is:  
- How is the police reform related to the changing political environment in 
Egypt between 2011 and 2015?  
Accordingly, few other questions are tackled as follow: 
- What is the ideal reform conforming the Egyptian case?  
- Which aspect of the four democratic policing norms is more likely to 
emerge in Egypt? And why? 
The study tackles two variables which are changing political environment, as 
independent, and the police reform as dependent. Previously I was intending to 
incorporate democratization as an independent variable, yet the changes in the 
Egyptian political context between 2011 and 2015 cannot really be described as a 
democratization process. First, because some argues that what happened in Egypt was 
a clear revolution that is still developing until today. Hence, it does not correspond to 
the gradual and peaceful nature of a democratization process. Second, political change 
perfectly applies to what happened in Egypt, regardless of the orientation of this 
change towards a democracy or an autocracy. It only identifies the occurrence of 
certain aspects of change without specifying the direction and the description of this 
change. For that same reason, political transition was not adopted as an independent 
variable. Transition actually suggests a certain path towards a specific end, which was 
not the case in Egypt in the last four years, since this end was not that clear nor 
successfully reached.  And by changing political environment I mean the change that 
occurred in the laws, regulations and constitutional principles and that impacted the 
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Egyptian political life. It also applies to the change that occurred in the different state 
institutions especially the executive (change of government), legislative (change of 
parliament) and judiciary bodies. Along the respective changes in the political culture 
of the people, that was reflected in their attitude and participation patterns. That was 
also reflected when the people chose to protest the police brutality on different 
occasions, then to abstain from protesting on other occasions. Then the repercussions 
of each of the two choices on promoting the police reform on the political agenda. In 
this regard, there are two distinct phases within the timeframe highlighted in this 
study, from January 2011 to June 2013, then from June 2013 to present (April 2015). 
Hence, the study tries to detect the change and continuity in the police policy when it 
comes to reform taking into consideration the respective changes occurring in the 
political environment.  
On the other hand, the police reform corresponds to the bunch of policies that 
transforms police apparatus in order to be more effective, abided by the law and the 
human rights principles. More details on the analytical framework in this regard are 
included in the following section.       
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III. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Police Reform  
In this part, police reform is examined through four norms of democratic policing 
to show how each of them contributes to democracy/autocracy consolidation in a 
changing political environment at large.   
A- Police Neutrality 
A crucial concept in democratic policing, neutrality refers to an apolitical apparatus, 
which provides public safety and security for all citizens without discrimination. It 
also refers to the police of the whole nation or people – not the police of a certain elite 
or political regime. The principle of neutrality contradicts police practice in 
authoritarian regimes, where political opponents are persecuted in order to undermine 
their participation in political life. Hence, in a country transitioning to democracy, the 
police should abide only by the law and not the directives of politicians or the ruling 
elite (Bayley 2006).  
Such a principle is of huge importance in building the legitimacy of the police, 
which will as a result be perceived as serving for all. Therefore, democratic police 
should not manipulate evidence or crime rates for the sake of a government’s political 
status; rather, it should act lawfully without any political affiliation or discrimination 
(Das 1995). Accordingly, a neutral police force equals one without any political 
narrative but the law. It should not, at least theoretically, adhere to a certain political, 
social, or economic narrative that values or discriminates against a specific social 
group. Otherwise, the police neutrality and legitimacy could easily be shaken (Das 
1995).  
In this regard, a democratic police force consists of two major procedures when it 
comes to neutrality: it should be independent of all political affiliation and it should 
enable all political parties to practice their civil and political rights without 
restrictions. 
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B- De-militarization of the Police 
A major criterion for democratic police is de-militarization, which corresponds to a 
clear differentiation between military and police forces and their respective jobs. 
According to democratic norms, the police should rely on more than just its weaponry 
and armory in order to gain the public’s trust. To better serve the public, the police 
should emphasize its civilian nature and be differentiated from the military. Extensive 
arming of the police can be an obstacle that impedes peaceful interactions between the 
police and the public it is serving. Accordingly, the police should realize that its job 
does not only rely on firearms but rather many other elements as well. The police 
should work with citizens to address their fears, mediate in social conflicts to prevent 
them from transforming into violent incidents, and work in criminal investigations in 
cooperation with prosecutors. Thus, force should be a minor aspect of police work 
and only applied if other methods are proven to be incapable of solving the problem 
in question (Bayley 1994, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).   
Other forms of de-militarization correspond with the rupture in military traditions 
within the organization of the police. Civilian ranks and management patterns should 
be emphasized rather than the old military patterns. Nevertheless, some would argue 
that para-military forces within the police are necessary in specific contexts, such as 
the French gendarmerie and the Italian carabinieri. In this regard, the organizational 
structure of these forces should be separated from the rest of the police to preserve its 
civilian nature. Accordingly, some contexts, like a terrorist threat, can mandate para-
military police activities. But still, the more police are heavily armed, the less they 
will interact closely with the public, thereby losing one of the most important tools in 
countering terrorism – people's trust (Kraska & Cubellis 1997, Pino & Wiatrowski 
2006). Hence, this study will focus on the separation of the police from the military 
forces, and the split of the military tradition from the police as well as the role of para-
military forces, namely the central security forces- CSF, in Egypt’s counter-terrorism 
strategy. 
C- Professionalism 
Democratic police should be professional and effective in performing their duties. In 
this regard, police violence and brutality reflects a serious lack of professionalism, 
when an officer is unable to solve cases without applying excessive force or torture. 
15 
 
Here, the problem of police brutality could easily be dealt with if officers receive 
proper training and education that enables them to act without violating the law and 
human rights. This perspective applies to police violence whether during 
investigations, arrest, and while handling mass demonstrations (Das 1995). 
Accordingly, applying physical and psychological force in criminal interrogations 
does not entail professional effectiveness as it can lead to false confessions and 
misleading results (Costanzo & Redleich, 2010).   
Professionalism has different interpretations and procedures; it also involves 
providing adequate salaries that decrease officers’ tendencies towards corruption. A 
decent salary and comprehensive financial package for policemen will decrease their 
inclinations towards accepting bribes or misusing their authority to generate an 
unlawful income.  
Professionalism also corresponds to good education, training, and suitable tools 
that enable officers to perform their duties without breaking the law. Legal education 
on human and civil rights will decrease policemen’s disposition to illegal behavior. 
Also, practical training that predicts different situations policemen might face will 
help them deal with future situations in a less violent way. Training in soft skills such 
as decision making, negotiations, and conflict prevention enables policemen to better 
decide when to use live ammunition and when to use language and persuasion (Stone 
& Ward 2000). Extensive training in investigation methods allows policemen to build 
their cases on solid evidence rather than violently-extracted confessions. 
Professionalism also involves suitable patterns of management, recruitment, and 
promotions based solely on merit. If policemen are recruited based on objective 
criteria, they will more likely retain their training and then adhere to the force’s 
internal regulations. Accordingly, merit-based promotions will help a good leader be 
promoted to a suitable rank within the management hierarchy. Likewise, a 
management based on objective systems of incentives means that rewards and 
punishment can be used to consolidate the police doctrine based on democratic norms 
and minimize wrongdoing and violations. Some writings include in the 
professionalism the internal control unit which evaluates police performance and 
punishes wrongdoings, while other writings consider this part as the internal aspect of 
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police accountability. Nevertheless, the internal control unit should be considered as 
an integral part of police professionalism. This is simply because professional police 
cannot function properly if they do not incorporate internal effective disciplinary 
mechanisms, favoring good performance and punishing offences. In this regard, the 
internal control unit should evaluate police performance according to two points: their 
ability to lower the crime rate and their respect of human rights (Stone & Ward 2000). 
Some internal control units simply investigate reported misconduct or misuse of 
firearms after their occurrences; others keep track of all officers' records to identify 
those who commit repeated mistakes to a point where they are seen as dangerous to 
the whole apparatus and thus must be dismissed. A third type is more aggressive in 
protecting the integrity of the apparatus, such as staging a bribe to randomly test an 
officer's integrity or inclination towards corruption (Stone and Ward 2000).  
Considering all of these measures, the democratic norms – in a democratic 
policing model – precisely define professional police performance.  Thus, the degree 
of professionalism and institutional reform within the police is directly related to the 
force’s legitimacy and public image. Legitimacy, which is "the consent of the 
governed," is a founding pillar of a democratic regime, without which the police will 
lose citizens’ voluntary compliance with legal orders (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).  
Some would suggest that policy guidelines should be established to better 
structure police work in every way. These written guidelines must highlight both what 
is allowed and what is not in order to provide a variety of alternatives for the police to 
follow (Kelling 1999, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). These guidelines should emphasize 
transparency in managing the police, while also serving as a basis for accountability 
when investigating misconduct.  
This study does not consider all of these measures. Instead, it focuses on salaries, 
anti-corruption measures, promotional criteria, recruitment, training patterns, and 
internal control mechanisms.  
D- Accountability 
"The police in democratic societies are created by that society and the police are 
therefore accountable to the citizens of that society" (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). The 
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major criterion that differentiates a democratic police from other forms of police is 
civilian oversight over the police force’s work. Apart from the internal control 
mechanism that holds police accountable within its own administrative chain of 
command, civilian oversight counts among the external accountability mechanisms. 
There are plenty of accountability mechanisms that target police work in a 
democracy.  
The first level of external or civilian oversight is exercised by prosecutors, who 
scrutinize police work by reviewing evidence in criminal cases or launching 
investigations into controversial cases (Stone & Ward 2000). Another civilian 
oversight mechanism is granted to the courts or the judiciary, which have the 
authority to omit evidence or confessions if proven to have been collected illegally. 
The courts have another authority over police performance through civil litigation 
undertaken by victims of police misconduct. These trials are extremely important in a 
democratic policing model; if the judiciary is not able to hold the perpetrator of police 
misconduct accountable, then the whole legitimacy of the justice system will be 
shaken in the eyes of its citizens. Such an idea of judiciary failure corresponds to the 
impunity of some individuals in society, unacceptable in a democratic regime in 
which the rule of law should reign (Stone & Ward 2000).  Parliaments in democratic 
regimes also have an authority of oversight over the police. This parliamentary 
oversight is exercised through budgets; it occurs when parliaments review budgets, 
grant funding for a certain project, or investigate corruption issues with regards to 
police spending. Moreover, parliaments have the authority to investigate a certain 
policy or case that results in controversy. But in other situations, parliaments review 
the police force’s plan as a whole and evaluate police performance on a yearly basis. 
Above all other accountability mechanisms, parliaments have the authority to design a 
new policy/bill regulating police work in order to avoid misconduct or enhance its 
future performance (Stone & Ward 2000).   
Between the political and the judicial accountability mechanisms comes the 
ombudsman, an oversight commission, also known as an inspector general or civilian 
complaint review board. An ombudsman usually receives complaints regarding police 
performance or misconduct, and investigates them thoroughly by checking official 
documents and, in some cases, interrogating witnesses. It might also have the 
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authority to transfer the case to a criminal court or to the head of the police force to 
decide on an administrative penalty. Another important part of an ombudsman’s role 
is that it has the authority to advise the police on needed training or policy guidelines 
to initiate reforms that will help avoid potential misconduct in the future. Thus, it has 
the ability to shape the police’s future protocol (Stone & Ward 2000).  
In addition to state institutions, civil society also plays a significant role in the 
accountability process. Human rights and research organizations need to be involved 
in advocacy in order to foster a culture based on human rights, dismantle the impunity 
system, and support victims of police misconduct both legally and culturally. These 
organizations should work to promote police accountability on the political agenda of 
state institutions. This role should be complemented by the media to widen the circle 
of impact and forge a culture that respects human rights and does not tolerate 
violations. Accordingly, civil society should be active in explaining that a strong and 
effective police does not equal human rights abuses, but should rather perform its 
duties with full respect for human rights and liberties (Stone & Ward 2000, Pino & 
Wiatrowski 2006).  Applying more of these mechanisms will translate into more 
democratic police norms being emphasized. Hence, this study will investigate these 
mechanisms to determine which are likely to exist in the Egyptian context and which 
are not. 
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IV. Literature Review 
 The topic of security sector reform at large and the police reform in specific is 
relatively new and has not been tackled enough in Arab literature. However, the 
international literature is sizeable in this record, and with multiple perspectives, 
among them being reform’s relation to democratization and political change. 
International debate has focused primarily on three types or models for police work – 
professional policing, or the traditional way to do the job; community policing, the 
American innovative way to do the job; and democratic policing, the reformed way to 
do the job, with interaction with other civil authorities to protect human rights and 
balance the security/freedom dilemma.  
In the professional model, policing is done solely by the police apparatus, which 
defines the determinants of security and implements them with no visible partnership 
with the community. In community-policing, an essential partnership is built between 
the police department and local community to define the sources of threats to public 
security and the best strategies to encounter them. Similarly, the democratic policing 
model involves a deep partnership with the community, but on a more national and 
macro level. Therefore, democratic policing presents a multiplicity of oversight 
mechanisms targeting police work, in which security is part of a wider plan for 
respecting human rights and consolidating the democratic regime in question.  
The American literature took the lead in discussing the requirements and 
conditions for successful police reform, whether from the American experience itself 
or due to American involvement in rebuilding Germany and Japan after WWII. 
Nevertheless, the American literature primarily emphasizes the professionalism of a 
strong police apparatus, enabled with all professional tools and equipment to better 
protect the public safety. Therefore, American literature on police reform since the 
1960s is anchored mainly in the major perspectives of management and organization.  
These writings aimed to assess the ability of police departments in coping with 
new societal needs and improving their respective performances. Some studies 
focused on assessing the reasons for resistance to change and the best ways to 
introduce acceptable and applicable changes without stimulating protests from 
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frontline officers. Lingamneni's (1979) paper, "Resistance to change in Police 
organizations: the Diffusion Paradigm", tackled this issue precisely. The study 
considered the main reasons for police officers and leaders to refute an innovative 
policy, as well as different procedures that could facilitate improvements in police 
agencies. The study emphasized the nature of the policy, the degree of its compliance 
with the general culture within the police, and the nature of police leaders/officers 
who could best embrace advances. Other trends focused on assessing the structural 
reforms applied in different police departments and whether or not they had positive 
repercussions on police performance as a whole. Maguire, Shin, Zhao, and Hassell's 
paper (2003) on the "Structural change in large police agencies during the 1990" 
specified seven main structural reforms associated with the community-oriented 
policing (COP) and tried to track them in American police agencies in the 1990s. The 
COP perspective required functional and vertical differentiation to be decreased, 
along with formalization, centralization and administrative intensity. However, 
occupational and spatial differentiation should be increased. Based on federal police 
data, American police forces applied only some aspects of the COP's prescription, 
while other aspects still faced resistance to change. Despite the importance of the 
study in assessing major structural changes in American police forces, it was based 
only on quantitative rather than qualitative data and thus could have gained greater 
insight through the contextualization of these changes.  
Other American studies have presented the new techniques that police 
departments in different states have used to better investigate crimes, gain the 
community's trust, and conduct intelligence-led policing under the umbrella of COP. 
Bayley's paper, "Police Reform: Who done it? " (2008), presents an overview of most 
of the changes and reforms applied by American police agencies as well as their 
contextual implications. The study offered good insight into the practical and 
theoretical motivations for each reform that has taken place within police policies in 
the last few decades.   Interestingly, Bayley stressed that most of these reforms were 
mainly inspired or encouraged by outsiders and not those within police agencies. 
Thus, he argues that police reformers are mostly ex-officers or experts from outside 
police organizations who provide valuable suggestions to improve police performance 
so as to better respond to society's needs. Other aspects of the American literature 
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focused on the intersection between police effectiveness and the accountability 
mechanisms to which they are subjected. These writings primarily argued that 
increased accountability procedures lead to better performance, thus demonstrating 
the positive correlation between good performance and accountability in police work. 
The importance of these studies lies in how they over-turned the long-standing 
argument that resisted accountability mechanisms on the grounds that they deprived 
police officers of the necessary authority to enforce the law. Ferdik's paper, 
"Perception is reality: A qualitative approach to understanding police officers’ views 
on civil liability"(2008), assessed police perceptions of civil liability, a major 
accountability. The author's assumption, built primarily on previous literature, was 
that police officers view civil liability negatively. The study relied on 23 in-depth 
interviews with police officers working in a southeastern American city and presented 
their perceptions based on their occupational, personal, and emotional experience 
regarding civil liability. The paper's major finding was that police officers do not 
necessarily have negative perceptions about civil liability as such. On the contrary, the 
majority of responses supported the process of civil liability since it constitutes the 
basis for all civil rights protected by the constitution. However, the police officers 
recommended many procedures to be implemented – in terms of training, legal 
education, and technology – in order to give them suitable protection while 
performing their jobs. Despite the sample’s limitation, which prevents the 
generalization of the findings, the paper was insightful in presenting a police 
viewpoint that favored accountability.  
A similar study by Paynne and Time, "Support for Miranda among Police chiefs: 
a Qualitative Examination" (2005), examined the evolution of police chiefs’ views in 
terms of eliminating the Miranda rule. The Miranda rule, issued in 1966, states that 
police officers must notify persons under arrest that they have the right to remain 
silent, since anything they say can be used against them in the investigation
2
.  If a 
person is not read the Miranda rule at the time of his/her arrest, the future judge has 
the authority to consider any confessions unlawful, deeply damaging the case. The 
study focused on determining whether the police chiefs believed that the Miranda rule 
                                                           
2
  “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a 
court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided 
for you. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to 
speak to me?” 
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enabled or impeded police work. The data was collected via 97 survey sheets filled 
out by the police chiefs in Virginia, including 75 who responded to the open-ended 
questions as well. On the contrary to previous literature from the 1970s and 1980s that 
presented the Miranda rule as an obstacle to law enforcement, the majority of the 
responses supported the Miranda rule, and even those who demanded it to be changed 
were merely requesting a more accurate formulation of the statement and not its 
cancelation. Therefore, this study presented the officers' positive views about the 
mechanisms that are tailored to make them more accountable while performing their 
job. The authors were not interested in explaining why opinions changed about the 
Miranda rule; instead, they clearly described why the officers supported it at the time.  
Most of those who supported the Miranda rule cited its effectiveness in enhancing 
police work, protecting civil rights, and implementing the constitution.     
Apart from the American experience, a new context since the early 1990s has 
introduced new understanding on police reform – or, more precisely, security-sector 
reform in general. After the fall of the USSR, eastern European countries managed to 
formulate negotiated transitions to democratic regimes. In these circumstances, the 
major task of the new governments was to dismantle the coercive apparatuses of the 
old regimes and rebuild them on new norms respecting democracy and human and 
civil rights. These democratic transitions were guided with international organizations 
involved in security such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Accordingly, some 
western countries were more involved in the assistance efforts to guide these 
transitions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This trend 
developed a new flow of financial and technical aids focusing mainly on rebuilding 
the security agencies on democratic rules to be more professional, abided by the law, 
and accountable to civil authorities. Hence, experts who were practically involved in 
assistance programs in eastern European and Latin American countries from the early 
1990s produced a large part of the related literature. They focused on the reform 
processes in the respective countries – the vetting, recruitment, training, and, most 
importantly, the legal framework linking the police apparatus with other public 
institutions. The major aim was to build or reform security agencies to be compatible 
with the emergent democratic rule.  
23 
 
Therefore, a large portion of the related literature dealt with the challenges faced 
by local and international reformers and foreign donors in order to present their 
experiences and to guide future reforms. An example was Pino and Wiatrowski's 
book, "Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries" (2006). The 
book consists of two parts. The first is primarily theoretical and conceptually links 
police reform and the democratization process. The second part focuses on case 
studies of police reforms in Iraq, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Kazakhstan. The 
main idea of the book is the interdependency between democratic policing and the 
democratization process, showing that democratic policing cannot exist without an 
interactive civil society and a high potential of social capital. The book 
underestimates the COP strategy, suggesting that it should be used in a wider context 
of human rights primacy to contribute on a deep level to building democratic policing 
practices. From this perspective, the book states that American police reforms based 
on the COP strategy are not enough to build democratic policing in countries that are 
going through the democratization process. Rather, the reforms must be a part of a 
comprehensive plan for democracy promotion based on transparency, legitimacy, rule 
of law, commitment to human rights accountability, and the subordination of the civil 
authority.  
Another example is Bayley's book, "Changing the Guards: Developing 
Democratic Policing Abroad" (2006), in which he discusses the challenges 
encountered by international donors and reformers in establishing democratic policing 
in conflict-torn societies. Given the disparities of the different contexts where 
international assistance on building democratic policing is introduced, Bayley gives 
the minimal basic criteria upon which new institutions should rely in order to be 
defined as democratic policing. He argues that democratic policing should be 
absolutely accountable to the civilian authority outside its command, abided by the 
law, conformed to international standards of human rights, and highly responsive to 
societal needs in public safety and security. Adding to this, the book discusses in 
detail the major reform strategies that should be prioritized as well as other 
complementary reforms that can be introduced gradually and in parallel to the main 
reform process. Bayley carefully explains the interdependency between the 
democratization process and the main criteria of police reform. On one hand, 
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democratic policing should be accountable to the law rather than to the government, 
which should preserve police neutrality vis-à-vis politicians and hence provide a 
security service for everyone and not just certain groups or elites. On the other hand, a 
democratic police force should primarily protect the major rights that constitute the 
democratic nature of the government, such as freedom of speech, associations, and 
other political and civil rights. A second trait of democratic policing is its 
accountability to people outside the force, such as the parliament, judiciary, or other  
civilian boards that review police performance. Such a trait emphasizes the primacy 
of civilian authorities over police work in a way that should promote the authority of 
the elected over unelected officials. A third trait is the necessity for professionalizing 
the police apparatus in a way that enables it to better fight crime without undermining 
the basic rights of the people. The professionalism equation is not isolated from the 
greater context of democratization since an effective police force is indispensable in 
an emergent democracy, providing security that the people need to practice their 
political rights in order to enrich the democratization process. The book also offers an 
important insight about the efforts of international assistance in the Security Sector 
Reform- SSR to facilitate the evaluation and thus the improvement of these efforts in 
the future.    
A similar attempt to draw the defining criteria for democratic policing was 
introduced by Ungar (2010) in his book, "Policing Democracy: Overcoming 
Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America". Here, Ungar determines certain 
aspects of democratic policing that should be developed in parallel to provide a 
security policy based on citizens' basic rights. He highlights the importance of agency 
restructuring, whether in terms of enhancing geographical decentralization or 
specialization or changing the types of internal authority. A second aspect of reform 
that he presents is professional support based on salaries, job security, enhanced 
technology, and equipment. The third aspect is the control mechanisms that take 
different forms, ranging from an internal affairs unit within the police to the national 
ombudsman. He then focuses on the legal changes that should accompany all these 
reforms to provide a legal basis for change, changes that involve not just the police 
but also the entire criminal justice system. Finally, Ungar discusses community 
policing as a method to enhance police-citizen interactions and improve the 
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apparatus’ responsiveness to the people's needs. After proposing a police reform 
model, the author then considers the experiences of several Latin American countries 
in evaluating their accomplishments in this regard, based on field work and in-depth 
interviews he conducted with local prosecutors, judges, and police officers. He 
concludes with recommendations on overcoming obstacles to reform in Latin 
American police forces.   
Another important book – and in-line with Unger’s – is "Policing Developing 
Democracies", edited by Hinton and Newburn (2009), which includes 12 case studies 
about reforming police apparatuses across four different continents, in countries going 
through different stages of the democratization process. In the introduction, the 
editors define the major norms that should guide reforms introduced in a new 
democracy: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of power, 
information, redress, and participation. On the other hand, the editors present the 
special circumstances in which new democracies survive, such as weak institutional 
structures, corruption, a weak rule of law, poverty, inequality, high crime rates, 
societal instability, and low levels of accountability. Hence, they discuss how 
different types of police reform should interact with each of these conditions in an 
emergent democracy in order to create a sustainable reform process within the police 
apparatus. The book is very useful in terms of looking at reform in action with regards 
to political context and the possible obstacles that any change might face.   
Fuentes' "Contesting the Iron Fist: the Advocacy Network and the Police Violence 
in Democratic Argentina and Chile" (2005) offers a slightly different argument. By 
studying the network of human rights advocates who promote police reform as well as 
those who support the status quo in terms of the police's iron fist, Fuentes finds that 
introduced reforms are kept at the theoretical level and face real challenges in being 
implemented. Fuentes argues that the political reforms introduced in Latin American 
countries since the 1980s have failed to protect citizens' civil rights that have been 
desecrated by police violence. In countries where the state is implementing 
socioeconomic reforms or structural institutional changes, the government tends to 
introduce a strong police apparatus to manage social discontent. In this regard, the 
advocacy networks managed to promote police reforms on the political agenda, but 
they were less influential when it came to effecting the reforms' actual 
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implementation within the police apparatus or criminal justice system. The author 
incorporated other intermediary variables such as the structure of the political 
opportunity, the nature of the policy actors, both those promoting and resisting the 
reform, and the nature of the security problem as well as the security/liberty dilemma.        
Stone and Ward (2000) introduce a more detailed vision of the accountability 
mechanisms that should govern police work in an emergent democratic regime. In 
their study, "Democratic Policing: a Framework for Action", they stress the 
importance of multi-leveled accountability mechanisms, which they say aren’t 
contradictory but rather complementary in preserving wider control over police work 
in a democratic regime. They explore three different types of accountability 
mechanisms: internal control, governmental control, and civil society control. Despite 
the importance of all three types, the authors emphasize the special importance of 
internal control in promoting professionalism and discipline within police work. They 
survey reforms promoted through transparency, training, technology, and 
organizational and cultural change. The authors also discuss the external control 
mechanisms conducted by the government and the dilemma of civilian politicians 
controlling the police without undermining its neutrality. The study focuses greatly on 
prosecutors' authority in promoting police accountability through legal procedures, 
civil litigation, and public trials. Further, the issue of parliamentary oversight is 
presented through two perspectives – budget control and inquiries of police 
misconduct. The third level of accountability – civil society control – involves social 
control over police work through the media, civilian oversight boards that investigate 
police offences, and research and human rights organizations promoting change. This 
paper provides a wide overview of different procedures of accountability applied to 
police work, arguing that police work will be more democratic as more of these 
mechanisms are introduced.  
The multi-ethnic conflicts that exploded in the 1990s have produced several 
international peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Balkans, Asia, and Central 
America. In this regard, the UN and other international organizations involved in 
these missions shifted their security angle from inter-country peacekeeping to intra-
country peacekeeping. Therefore, civilian police forces were much needed as the 
military troops employed in these areas to preserve security and public safety. Many 
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guidelines and manuals have been published by international participants in these 
missions to highlight the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the basics of building 
new institutions, and the balance between local ownership and international expertise 
(USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction  
2011 - OEDC/DAC Handbook on SSR 2007). These guidelines emphasize the inter-
dependency of the political process and the security condition, thereby focusing on 
the balanced composition of the new apparatus to guarantee its legitimacy and 
representation. The SSR programs were complemented by Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration -DDR as well as transitional justice programs to 
ensure the new state’s monopoly over arms and to allow it to control the circle of 
violence.  
The most important African experiences in this regard, according to Bendix and 
Stanely (2008), were in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where UN missions were deeply 
involved with international donors and local stakeholders to design and implement a 
holistic SSR model. In both conflict-torn countries, the military, police, intelligence 
apparatus, and justice system were rebuilt upon the rule of law, civilian oversight, and 
political neutrality. The DDR and SSR plans were applied in parallel with heavy 
funding from the UK and the US, engaging a wide range of local stakeholders 
including parliament committees and civil society organizations. Therefore, Bendix 
and Stanley pose the impact of international donors as the main factor for these two 
countries’ success, as opposed to other cases such as South Africa, where the SSR 
process was managed through national and local actors. Therefore, South Africa is in 
fact a better case to evaluate in order to get a deeper understanding about locally-
managed SSR processes in transitions, as it will be examined in details in the 
international experiences part.  
Despite the range of recommended policies, the literature also emphasized that 
there is no perfect solution to preserve security and public safety in this context. Most 
of the authors’ recipes give priority to the local context in prioritizing the needed 
reforms. But the political context can be extremely manipulative, to the extent of 
refuting the core of these reforms. Besides, international actors/donors involved in 
these missions had a multiplicity of perspectives and motivations that influenced the 
outcomes. On one hand, the whole rationale of post-conflict peacekeeping and 
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reconstruction missions is to link the security issue with prospects of state building 
and governance. But this logic is also closely related to countries’ chances for 
development. Thereby, there are some conflicting considerations guiding the 
missions' decisions regarding the stabilization angle and the reconstruction angle. In 
some cases, for instance, ex-combatants were reintegrated in the new police apparatus 
for reasons of political legitimacy, while the apparatus's personnel should be 
downsized for professional reasons to better operate and recruit on a merit- basis only. 
Additionally, the SSR programs were heavily co-funded by international development 
institutions based on the fact that the number-one step in development is to securitize 
or provide security in order to later introduce development programs. Several purely 
developmental institutions such as the British Department for International 
Development have been involved in security programs in multi-ethnic societies, 
especially in Africa, since the 1990s.    
Taking into consideration the different types of literature regarding police reform, 
there is an additional trend that discusses the failures of the reform experiences. 
These writings essentially investigate the reasons for the resilience of old police 
practices that were subjected to radical structural reforms. Fetsch (2013) discussed the 
failure of institutional reforms in the Mexican police over two decades, starting from 
the mid-1990s. His main finding was that although the reforms were quite radical and 
structural, they could not challenge the persistent culture and pattern of authority 
within the Mexican state and society. Different forms of contextual, cultural, and 
societal obstacles blocked the reforms from being widespread, such as corruption, 
clientelism, corporatism, neo-patrimonial networks, a weakness of state institutions in 
the third-world countries, the legacy of colonialism, underdeveloped social capital, 
and informal "rules of the game."  The same logic guided Chan (1996) when he 
wondered why the Australian police persisted in its wrongdoings after almost a 
decade of radical and structural reforms guided by the model of COP. The reforms 
saw a reformist leadership take control, with new personnel recruited and new 
organizational structures put in place, in addition to new policies and strategies being 
introduced and emphasized through extensive training. Nevertheless, the police’s 
performance continued to be anchored in brutality and lacked the people's trust. 
Chan’s major reason for this here was resilient police culture that impeded or even 
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manipulated the reforms. The police culture, as she saw it, was a combination of 
political and social culture, as well as an occupational culture that emerged from the 
nature of the job itself. 
On the Arab level, literature about security sector reform has investigated the 
relationship between authoritarian Arab regimes and police apparatuses that have 
usually mixed together to form the "police state". Some of the literature discussed the 
relations of nepotism and corruption as well as their impacts on the security sector's 
performance. Other studies, though, firmly stressed  the deep relationship between the 
nature of the political regime in place and the security sector, thereby highlighting the 
structural obstacles to reform. Sayigh (2007) adhered to the latter argument, pointing 
to the difference between re-building the security sector in Iraq and Palestine, and the 
experience of the rest of the Arab world. He also differentiated between America’s 
proactive engagements in these two cases, and, on the contrary, the limited de-
politicized involvement in other countries where authoritarian regimes are strong US 
allies. In contrast to US policy, European nations promoted gradual reform through 
the civil society's activity and oversight, rather than through deeper structural 
improvements in the security apparatuses themselves. After criticizing both western 
approaches, he finally recommends local ownership of the reform process through 
introducing legislative, organizational, and professional reforms that gradually shift 
the relationship between the political regime and the security apparatuses. However, 
he does not specify the motives of the authoritarian regimes to introduce such reforms 
and to undermine their own wide authorities.  
Adopting the same logic, Wolff (2011) criticizes the western approaches in 
dealing with the Arab region through security rapprochement with authoritarian 
regimes. She argues that the supremacy of anti-terrorism and migration policies over 
western-Arab relations forced western policy makers to turn a blind eye to violations 
of basic human rights in the Arab region. Hence, democratization vs. stability formed 
the core of the west’s approach to the region. However, the Arab revolts of 2011 have 
proven that the absence of basic rights in Arab countries could not sustain security on 
the long term. Thus, Wolff says, the west needs a new approach to engage with Arab 
states in reforming their security apparatuses, consolidating their judiciary 
independence, and deepening their governance measures, in order to create a more 
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viable security alliance between both sides. Her paper is primarily critical of gaps and 
contradictions in western-Arab security relations, while also precisely highlighting 
several platforms and recommendations to build a new approach to security relations, 
one that should comply with the norms put forward by the Arab revolts.   
Accordingly, the Arab revolts introduced the SSR as a top priority in the Arab 
political context and opened the way for any literature in this regard. Ashour (2014) 
argues that security agencies' brutality was in fact a major cause for the Arab revolts 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Therefore, a successful SSR is an accurate 
indicator for the success of the Arab revolts' goals. However, the Arab SSR faced 
several challenges due to intense political polarization in the post-revolutionary 
context, internal resistance within security agencies, and weak knowledge about the 
SSR among political elites. Further obstacles came from  limited financial resources, 
weak democratic institutions, an incomplete DDR in conflict-torn countries, and 
limited regional support for the SSR to take place in the Arab region. Ashour's paper 
thoroughly investigates the challenges of the SSR in the Arab region, yet it gives 
almost no room to discussing the possibility of the reforms taking place. An exception 
is Tunisia, which remains outside the pessimist context as it sought international 
assistance in this regard from the very beginning of its transition.  
The Tunisian experience was actually quite similar to the Egyptian one, but for 
several specific variations. The different managements of the transitional period have 
given some spaces to invest in some of the SSR dimensions. However, Bouguerra 
(2014) is quite critical in evaluating the Tunisian experience, arguing that 
international assistance was important, but that it did not institutionalize civilian 
oversight nor created police accountability. He considers the SSR’s big moment as 
occurring right after the revolution – but argues that the political elite lacked the 
knowledge to enforce it on a holistic approach basis. Nevertheless, ratifying 
international conventions against torture, establishing a national commission to fight 
torture, forming several police unions, and recruiting new police personnel (almost 
one-fifth of the police force have been newly recruited) were all important steps in 
breaking the old police tradition. Although over 12 countries are bilaterally 
cooperating with Tunisia to support "train and equip programs," the country’s police 
budget and internal management still lack transparency, which impedes any real 
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assessment of the degree of progress in this regard. Therefore, Bouguerra suggests a 
comprehensive approach on SSR that includes the efforts of international donors 
along with the government and civil society, combining an equal interest in building 
capacities and setting checks and balances over police work. He also recommends 
establishing collective platforms for cooperation and information-sharing about 
terrorist threats among regional neighboring countries.         
On the Egyptian level, literature about security sector reform is quite limited, 
focusing mainly on giving reform prescriptions to transform the police apparatus. 
Ashour (2012) succeeds in contextualizing the needed reform by introducing the 
meaning of the SSR and its implications, along with the history of Egypt’s police and 
wrongdoing. He then analyzes the slight reforms that were applied and contrasts them 
with the civic demand to apply much more comprehensive reforms. He provides 
interesting analysis regarding the political context in Egypt, which was not favoring 
any deep reform. The main idea is that the balance of power within the Egyptian state 
after the revolution continued to preserve the status quo in terms of security. This is 
closely related to civil-military relations in Egypt’s power equation in general, and to 
civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses more specifically. 
Therefore, the SSR was perceived as a dependant variable on a successful democratic 
transition in the country. Ashour’s recommendations are quite tailored to the Egyptian 
case and do not merely highlight general principles that apply to any case of police 
reform.  
Accordingly, Brumberg and Sallam (2012) stress the tight interdependency 
between the current security sector and the political regime in Egypt.  Adopting a 
wider definition of the security sector, they include the military alongside the police 
apparatus and also underline the historical background of the two institutions, thereby 
concluding that any potential SSR in Egypt should rely on the will of the political 
elite, especially the president, along with the mandatory consent of the military. In 
this regard, the international community should support any enhancement of the 
security sector’s performance to support civilian oversight and respect for human 
rights. 
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In his 2012 paper, "Above the State: the Officers' Republic in Egypt", Sayigh 
builds upon his previous work to focus on the Egyptian case. Here, he introduces the 
deep involvement of military officers in Egypt’s economy and political rule since the 
1952 revolution. Different types of professional control and financial incentives were 
applied to distance the military from meddling in politics, especially in Mubarak's era. 
Therefore, the military was regarded as a caste of officers playing almost a single role 
in political life,: preserving its essential social and economic interests. Sayigh also 
discusses the hidden political role played by military retirees who hold several posts 
across the entire all over the echelon of the state’s bureaucracy, which in turn deepens 
the militarized nature of the state. In the same logic, the paper introduces the 
competition between the different security agencies in Egypt, namely the military, 
police, and intelligence, arguing that the role played by the military in ousting 
Mubarak placed it above other agencies in the post-revolutionary context. Therefore, 
the main aim of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during its 
transitionary rule, and even after presidential elections in 2012, was to preserve a 
supra-constitutional status for the military in political life in order to maintain its 
social and economic interests. In this context, the drafting of the constitution and the 
creation of a permanent military council were planned to consolidate the military’s 
position in politics, even after the end of the SCAF's mandate. Although the paper 
presents several aspects of the military’s control over economic and administrative 
life in Egypt, it nearly ignores the implications of this control on national and internal 
security. The police’s role is discussed briefly to show its competition with the 
military in certain areas, yet the military's impact on police conduct and performance 
is missing from the paper.  
A more elaborated attempt to assess the competition between the military and the 
police and its implications on Egypt's security was undertaken by El-Houdaiby (2014) 
in his paper, "Changing Alliances and Continuous Oppression: the Rule of Egypt's 
Security Sector." Here, he carefully investigates the change that occurred in the 
alliances of the military, police, and ruling elite in Egypt, whether the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) before the revolution or the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
afterwards. Accordingly, the paper thoroughly presents the motivations of each party 
in concluding and then breaking these alliances in terms of the political context. 
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Similarly, the author highlights the repeated chances that were missed to refute the 
rule of the security sector in Egypt and introduce civilian control over these 
institutions. The paper's analysis underlines the growing competition between the 
military and the police in Egypt, without denying the supremacy that the military has 
gained after ousting Mubarak and then Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Therefore, the paper 
gives great priority to discussing political interactions related to the SSR, rather than 
discussing the core of the SSR itself. It also presents the internal cohesion in the 
military and the police as a major factor defining each institution’s attitude in terms of 
preserving their interests on different occasions.    
In light of the previous literature review, specific models of police reform in 
countries passing through changing political environments should be tackled. The 
literature guided me to examine police reform initiatives in Brazil and Turkey as cases 
of long term reform. Then, Poland and South Africa are presented as an example of 
short term reform. Both types of cases have witnessed different experiences of 
changing political environment which was reflected in the interplay of the reform and 
the challenges that faced it. Brazil was chosen because of its previous experience of 
military rule as well as its reactive reform policy of the police after each of the 
security crises it faced. Turkey was also chosen for its unsettled civil military relations 
and the primacy of its armed forces over the political scene on different occasions. 
Nevertheless, both countries have witnessed a certain level of democratic continuity 
despite the obvious role of the military on the political scene. Then, Poland was 
chosen to highlight the example of a radical police reform on the short term that went 
hand in hand with a wider political transformation to democracy. Yet, even in a 
general context of democratization, the political change that occurred in Poland via 
electoral means was reflected on the police reform with a respective change in police 
laws and regulations. This was obvious when the ruling elite changed several times 
since the beginning of the political transformation in 1989. As for South Africa, this 
model was chosen to highlight the difficulty of implementing a radical police reform, 
even if it was decided and designed by a political consensus. The South African case 
reflects the complication of applying a consensual reform plan in a context of growing 
crime rates. Despite the relative success in building the South African police 
legitimacy, fighting crimes required alternative policy to transform the police into an 
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effective and professional force. Thereby, these experiences are examined in the next 
section, in order to come up with some lessons for the Egyptian case. 
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V. International Experiences of Police Reform in Changing Political 
Environment 
This chapter will examine international experiences of police reform in 
countries that have faced changing political environments in the last three decades and 
have since enjoyed a relatively stable democratic process. The cases of Brazil, Poland, 
Turkey, and South Africa are examined as follows: 
A- Brazil 
1. Context 
Brazil was under authoritarian military rule from 1964-84, but in 1984 it held direct, 
free elections that marked the country’s first step towards democratization. 
Nevertheless, police reform was not on the political agenda until the early 1990s, 
when consecutive security and public safety crises forced a discussion to take place. 
These crises were directly related to increasing crime rates as well as popular protests 
rejecting police violence, especially in poor neighborhoods and slums.  
The police apparatus in Brazil is divided into two branches, the military and 
the civil police. The military police is uniformed, organized, and equipped like the 
military forces, and is in charge of patrols and arrests; the force numbers around 
390,450 across all Brazilian states. The civil police is responsible for criminal 
investigations and preparations for prosecutions, and numbers around 155,960 
(Hinton, 2009). Most of police work is conducted by the local, state-affiliated police, 
while the federal-level police is less involved in street policing and instead focuses on 
national cases related to terrorism and drugs that are investigated by an FBI-like 
apparatus containing around 10,000 sworn officers (Skogan, 2013 & Hinton, 2009).  
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform   
Police reform in Brazil over the last three decades has taken different shapes, with 
several different strategies. Generally, the reform took place as a reaction to several 
security crises and not introduced as a group of reform policies to accompany the 
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democratic process. Additionally, the changes were induced on the local level through 
a decentralized series of reform initiatives that combined the effort of the human 
rights community, prosecutors, university professors, and several open-minded police 
chiefs. These efforts coincided with the international donors' will to reduce police 
violence and enhance law enforcement techniques to support the Brazilian process of 
development.  
3. Reform Initiatives  
Inside the favelas (slums), police presence was almost impossible, unless 
through heavily-armed officers who usually raided the favelas for searches or arrests, 
causing many causalities among the inhabitants. In 2000, a new initiative was 
launched to establish police groupings in special areas (GAPE) in order to securitize 
one of the biggest slums in Rio. The GAPE force was unarmed, instead employing the 
Community Policing- CoP strategy to reduce the use of force and build trust within 
the population. The initiative was successful in establishing permanent police patrols 
in the slum, reducing rates of violence, boosting gun control, minimizing drug gangs’ 
control over the favela, and empowering the population to move freely at any time. In 
2002, the GAPE initiative was extended to three other slums in Rio, upon the request 
of their inhabitants; however, this initiative was highly dependent on the personal 
skills of its commander and funds provided by NGOs to introduce the slum’s youth to 
alternatives  to crime (Da Silva & Cano, 2008).     
Some reform initiatives targeting improvements in police professionalism 
were the result of partnerships between police departments on the local level and 
public universities to develop nontraditional curricula in human rights and 
criminology for police officers.  This project aimed to loosen the traditional military 
culture of the police, build trust and networks between officers and academic elites, 
and enhance officers’ professionalism by channeling new skills and knowledge in 
action. This project was also extremely dependent on donors' funds as well as the 
personality of the military police commander (Leeds, 2007).  
Similar initiatives were introduced through partnerships between civil 
society/the human rights community and police departments to hold dialogue over 
human rights in action. These panels enabled police officers to express themselves 
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and think beyond the human rights curricula they had studied, fostering a wider 
perception of their meanings. The panels also helped build alliances among antagonist 
stakeholders and transcending stereotypes. One of these initiatives began as an 
advocacy campaign to report police misconduct in the early 1990s and ended up 
becoming the most important NGO in police training and arms control, Viva Rio. 
(Leeds, 2007) 
There was also a federal program conducted through the justice ministry – the 
National Program for Public Security and Citizenship (PRONASCI) – to enhance the 
local police’s capabilities and improve their work conditions. This program aimed to 
boost managerial and professional skills through comprehensive training and better 
equipment, as well as improve work conditions for low-level police officers. It also 
evaluated its own results through national surveys that analyzed changes in 
perceptions of police officers and the population. An example of this was a research 
on the impact of the program on officers' inclination towards the use of force in their 
daily work, which yielded the important finding that highly-educated and well-trained 
officers were less likely to use force. The same inclination was true for officers who 
were more experienced, compared to their lesser experienced colleagues. Likewise, 
the majority of those who had a positive perception about community policing were 
those who had received good training in different managerial and professional 
subjects. The same portion of surveyed officers coincided with high rates of job 
satisfaction (Skogan, 2013). Thus, we can conclude that a good training program to 
enhance police professionalism leads to higher rates of job satisfaction and a lesser 
inclination towards using force in a police force’s daily contact with citizens.    
Unlike the professionalism initiatives that were received positively by the 
police, the accountability mechanisms had greater difficulty in being established in 
Brazil. The first ombudsman was first established locally in five different states in the 
mid-1990s, and is now present in almost half of Brazilian states (13 out of 27 states). 
The ombudsman can come from the human rights community or be a former 
prosecutor. Their purpose is to receive complaints from citizens about police abuses 
or from low-ranking officers about their departments. In both cases, however, they 
have limited investigative authority, given the lack of clear, official police records. A 
further problem is that they are tightly linked to the states’ public safety secretariats, 
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which questions their independence. Similarly, they are appointed by governors, 
meaning their jobs can easily become politicized. (Leeds, 2007) 
4. Challenges  
Despite these initiatives, police performance remains under the expected level and 
faces many challenges that impeded the reform process. The main challenge in this 
regard is the discontinuity of successful initiatives due to a lack of funds, a change of 
leadership, and low degrees of institutionalization. Additionally, there is a lack of 
awareness about human rights and the need for police abuses to be criminalized. In 
fact, public culture has played a negative role, since it perceives police violence as an 
effective factor for reducing crimes. On the other hand, the oversight mechanism, 
namely the ombudsman, has no substantial authority to suggest a comprehensive plan 
for police reform and oversight. Thus, political opportunities following significant 
crises could allow new initiatives to be born, but they can hardly survive afterwards, 
since they are highly dependent upon the political context.   
 
B -Turkey 
1. Context 
Since the establishment of the modern Turkish state in 1923, the military has gained 
special status, enabling it to influence the political scene on several occasions, such as 
in 1960, 1971, 1980, and, much later, in 1997. Therefore, the military has successfully 
challenged civilian authority within the political regime by utilizing geopolitical 
arguments related to Middle Eastern instability and the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s 
national security. The Turkish police are functionally divided into two major divisions 
– the Turkish National Police (TNP), which is in charge of policing, conducting 
patrols, and investigations in urban areas, and the Jandarma, a more military-like 
force deployed for policing rural areas. While the TNP is a professional agency 
affiliated to the interior ministry, the Jandarma is formed of young soldiers serving 
their military duty (15 months) under the authority of the defense ministry 
(Goldsmith, 2009). The TNP consists of 193,000 personnel that receive two years of 
police training, while the Jandarma consists of 300,000 conscripts who receive only 
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six weeks of intensive military training. Despite the distinct differences in 
composition and training, these two divisions of Turkish police almost fulfill the same 
job, with their respective authorities separated by vague boundaries. In some areas 
where rural migration has invaded urban centers, both police agencies are present, 
while in other cases, both of them might be absent, thus creating a security vacuum. 
Adding to this is that each division’s internal regulations are not subject to open 
access, removing their work from public review.   
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform 
Turkey has enjoyed a democratic tradition since 1945. However, the country is not 
considered a consolidated democracy due to the frequent military interventions on its 
political scene. Hence, the case of police reform has always faced difficulties in 
becoming a priority in such a securitized political milieu in which the military 
contests civilian authority. Nevertheless, Turkey’s ambition to join the European 
Union has created momentum for police reform, serving as a veritable driver for a 
series of initiatives reorienting police work in Turkey (Goldsmith, 2009). 
3. Reform Initiatives  
Reform in Turkey is taking the shape of dispersed initiatives in different dimensions 
of police work, and is primarily motivated by the EU accession plan. The EU is 
funding a project tailored and managed by the United Nations Development Project 
(UNDP) to enhance civilian control over police agencies by improving the 
administrative skills of the civilian authority (governors) in their respective relations 
with the TNP, Jandarma, and interior ministry. The core of this project is extremely 
problematic, since the whole regime has a deep problem in managing civil/military 
relations; however, it is approaching this subject through building capacities and 
training cadres in order to deepen the accountability of the police to the civilian 
authority (Goldsmith, 2009). 
Other projects of reform are dedicated to improving the police agencies' capacities 
in investigations to better fight organized crime, money laundering, and narcotic-
related activities. This trend of enhancing the police's professionalism is part of a 
larger trend in the Turkish government since 2005 to minimize losses resulting from 
crimes by employing a preemptive approach. The latter method involves providing 
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the police with new technology and sophisticated equipment to build and analyze 
huge databases of potential criminals and crimes' mapping. The project aims to 
prevent potential crimes and threats from occurring by adopting a community-
policing project intertwined with a new model of technology-supported information 
systems. Such an approach cannot be implemented without an active model of 
intelligence-oriented policing that acquires data through surveillance cameras in 
public areas as well as screens citizens’ personal information to enrich the POL-NET 
database. Along with this project, a new crime-analysis center and public-order 
project were established to better prevent crimes (Berksoy, 2013). Nevertheless, these 
projects have been criticized for their preemptive nature and for dealing with specific 
citizens as potential criminals, namely the Kurds, political opposition groups, and 
trade unions. Moreover, officials’ access to a wide database of personal information 
has been deemed a threat to individual privacy.   
Despite the advancement of the professionalism projects, steps towards greater 
accountability have faced much resistance. In 2001, the constitutional court in Turkey 
issued a ruling about an amendment to the criminal code that enables policemen to 
use firearms on a terrorist suspect if he does not comply with calls to surrender or 
shows an intention to use weapons. The court's ruling canceled the amendment of the 
law that was introduced earlier in 1996 for being unconstitutional, as it jeopardizes the 
lives of suspects without sufficient reason, especially as it is not conditioned by 
suspects actually using arms against police officers, but rather only the intention to 
use them. Hence, the cancelation of this amendment was considered a gain for human 
rights and an upholding of article 17 of the constitution, which emphasizes a citizen’s 
right to life. Nevertheless, the criminal law was again amended in 2006, but this time 
it practically reversed the court's ruling by granting police officers wide authority to 
use firearms if a suspect does not show compliance with a call to surrender, without 
even mentioning the use of weapons. Since the court’s objection focused on the 
intention to use weapons and whether their use would actually threaten an officer's 
life, the new formulation of the law omitted the weapons' issue altogether, and 
considered a lack of compliance to the call of surrender as a good reason for an officer 
to use firearms (Berksoy, 2013). The case resulted in legislators and the government 
showing solidarity with the police, defying the concerns of the constitutional courts 
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regarding human rights. In other cases, however, legislators were aligned with the 
judiciary against the wide authority of the police; still, though, the police was able to 
impose its will at the last minute. Generally, police investigators were given authority 
to define the nature of the crime they were investigating, before transferring it to the 
courts. Hence, the police oriented the work of the judiciary by defining the crime and 
preparing the indictment. But in 2005, a new law of criminal procedures was drafted 
to narrow the police authority in this regard and prevent it from defining the crime 
beforehand. Additionally, the draft of the law established a new unit of judicial police 
under the authority of the justice ministry to deploy the police’s investigative 
apparatus under the supervision of prosecutors. Nevertheless, the amendment of the 
law was introduced without the judicial police unit due to fierce rejection by the 
interior ministry (Berksoy, 2013). Such a case reflected the power the police have 
against any attempt by another institution (outsiders) to impose reform, even if they 
are legislators and the judiciary. Moreover, the police continue to use its previous 
authority in defining crimes without minor compliance with the new law (Berksoy, 
2013).    
But EU pressure to establish accountability mechanisms to watch over police work 
was partly satisfied by the establishment in 2012 of two new institutions to oversee 
the police. The first, the Turkey Human Rights Institution, was created to work as an 
ombudsman that receives and investigates citizens' complaints of police misconduct 
before they are directed to the courts. However, the composition and funding of this 
institution has raised some doubts about its independence, since 10 out of its 11 
members were appointed by different governmental agencies. An EU report on the 
institution questioned its independence and recommended amending its laws so that 
its members are elected by another state institution, unaffiliated with the executive 
(Berksoy, 2013). The second accountability initiative was an internal control unit 
within the interior ministry named "The Police Oversight Commission." This 
commission is in charge of investigating alleged violations of human rights 
committed by police officers, annually evaluating police work, and recommending 
new reforms to the MOI to improve police performance (Berksoy, 2013). Despite the 
positive influence that these two institutions might bring to police accountability in 
Turkey, their work seems to be constrained. Specifically, there is an active 
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administrative law preventing any legal investigation of a governmental official, 
including police officers, without the consent of his/her direct manager. Therefore, if 
the police leadership wants to maintain the impunity of police officers, they can easily 
challenge the authority of these new institutions.            
 4. Challenges  
The main challenge to police reform in Turkey is obviously the wide authority that the 
military has on political life, considering the overlap between military and police 
functions. Some reform initiatives envisaging the downsizing of the Jandarma and the 
enhancement of its police training would directly affect the status of the Turkish 
Armed Forces, which is not easily tolerated. Therefore, no substantial reform can take 
place without the consent of the military. Besides, police control and oversight is not 
likely to happen if there is no real political will. But the Turkish government widely 
benefits from the huge authority granted to the police in its fight against the political 
opposition, especially leftists and trade unions. Thereby, the police work is politicized 
as long as it tends to criminalize political and social protests. Nevertheless, the EU's 
accession plan still plays a helpful role in pushing for police reform, as does the 
positive experience gained by the TNP and the Jandarma while serving in UN 
missions worldwide (Goldsmith, 2009). 
C- Poland 
1. Context 
In 1989, Poland witnessed a negotiated political transition that allowed free 
parliamentary elections to be held and a new government to be formed. The new 
government was jointly formed by the figures of the solidarity movement (the main 
opposition movement, born from a workers union coalition) and the old communist 
regime. Therefore, the democratization process has directly resulted in a major 
transformation plan for state institutions, especially the security sector. The new 
leaders of the country were aware of the importance of reforming the security 
apparatus as a precondition for the whole regime's transformation. Nevertheless, some 
writings mark 1980 as the beginning of the democratization process, when the 
solidarity movement, then a workers union, conducted a major strike that forced the 
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communist government to lower the prices of goods after an earlier increase. A short 
window of political openness was quickly ended with the imposition of martial law in 
late 1981. Hence, some analysts refer to this short democratization process of two 
years to explain the success of the negotiated transition in late 1989, based on sharing 
parts of the government with the opposition and old regime figures (Paun, 2007).  
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform 
The main driver of the reform was the transformation from a communist country to a 
democratic one; so, police reform was just a part of the wider reform plans. There was 
also a deep desire to break with the old practices of the communist police, which 
spied on society and controlled all political activity. Moreover, several prominent 
human rights figures were appointed to the top of the new police apparatus, to design 
the transformation plan and make sure it was properly implemented. Among the new 
designers of the security policy were also prominent police figures who were engaged 
in building police unions following the transition. But the most decisive driver was 
the funds and pressures that western European countries and the United States 
invested to accelerate the reform plan. They also participated in training new officers 
to respect human rights and democratic rules.  Added to this was Poland’s ambition to 
join NATO and the EU, a goal that was decisive in introducing several waves of 
reform within the security sector as a whole. Thus, Poland successfully joined NATO 
in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (Paun, 2007). 
3. Reform Initiatives  
The reform of Poland’s police was part of an extended reform aiming to place security 
forces under the oversight of civil elected authorities according to democratic rule. 
Therefore, the first step was to depoliticize police work by issuing a law in 1990 that 
prevented police members from involvement in politics or following political parties 
(Æwiek-Karpowicz & Kaczyñski, 2006). Nevertheless, Polish police officers are 
allowed to be active in professional police unions which negotiate with the 
government for better wages and work conditions (Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). 
Police reform in Poland occurred in several waves and was, interestingly, linked to 
the political affiliation of the ruling coalition. In 1990 and again in 1999, when 
solidarity was in power, reforms tended to decentralize the police service, bringing it 
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under the control of the civilian authority of provincial governors. But when the 
socialists governed in 1995 and 2002, reforms tended to centralize control over the 
police (Paun, 2007). The decentralization/centralization of the police had direct 
impacts on police organization, professionalism, and the accountability mechanisms 
that controlled their work.    
In 1990, Poland abandoned its old communist militia and created a new police 
force, with new uniforms and commanders. A new post of national police commander 
was created at the top of the police hierarchy, to be appointed by the interior minister 
upon the approval of an advisory committee comprised of politically diverse members 
from the higher and lower houses of parliament. Thus, the national police commander 
was responsible to parliament, in addition to his professional responsibility vis-à-vis 
the interior minister. Right after the local elections of 1990, new local police forces 
were created to fulfill the police patrolling locally while investigative authority 
remained in the hands of the national police. The local police were supposed to be 
funded by the local budget, but due to a lack of funds, the police localities were 
dependent on the central authority. However, the lack of funds encouraged a serious 
wave of corruption within the local police authority, to the extent of institutionalizing 
the channels of bribes to coincide with the hierarchy of the organization (Paun, 2007). 
Such a deficiency affected the local police’s effectiveness and helped back the post-
communists’ argument to recentralize the police structure when they gained power in 
1993.  
The 1995 reform abandoned the local police forces and brought them once again 
under central police authority, while also widening the prerogatives of police in using 
firearms. Nevertheless, when the different parties of the solidarity coalition were 
reunited in 1996, they won the elections and formed a government with an ambitious 
plan of decentralization. The new plan was implemented on the police in 1999, when 
new local police were created in each of the 16 provinces. The new local forces of the 
counties were subjected to a double mechanism of oversight by the local mayors and 
the provincial police chief to whom they were affiliated. Therefore, the local police 
were politically responsible to the local executive body and professionally responsible 
to the higher national police chief. Additionally, the local police chiefs had to present 
an annual report to the local legislative councils about their activities, deficiencies, 
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and challenges (Paun, 2007). Financially, the local police suffered from low 
resources, until 1999 when a new law required the national government to channel 
80% of the police budget to the localities and preserve only 20% for the national 
police departments (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006). The last reform, 
introduced in 2002, returned the right to choose local police chiefs to the hands of the 
higher police hierarchy, rather than local mayors and governors, after only unbinding 
consultation with the local executive and legislative bodies. Such a reform was 
recommended by several foreign security advisers, as well as being dictated by high 
levels of corruption and crime (Paun, 2007).            
Alongside the organizational and professional reforms, the new Polish police was 
subject to multiple accountability mechanisms. Among them was the firm 
differentiation between police work at large and the work of the secret police service, 
called the Security Bureau (SB), which was dissolved and replaced with a new entity, 
the State Protection office, which was strictly prohibited from spying on society. SB 
personnel, numbering around 25,000, were downsized to only 6,000 after verification 
to determine whether they should remain in office or be released (Grajewski, 2004). 
All leaders above 55-years-old were promptly released from office, while the younger 
generations were tested to make sure they were suitable for the new job. Almost 75% 
of the verified SB officers rejoined their work, whether with the office of State 
Protection or with the police in general. Similarly, the result of the verification 
process on ordinary police officers caused the release of almost 50% of commissioned 
officers and 30% of warrant police officers (Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). To 
compensate for these vacancies, new police officers were recruited and intensively 
trained by the US, UK, and Germany between 1990-95 on the basics of police work in 
a democracy (Paun, 2007- Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). Other analysts suggest that 
almost 50% of Polish police officers were dismissed, with the newly recruited and 
trained officers numbering around 50,000 in 1995 (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 
2006).  
Another aspect of reform was the lustration of politicians and public figures to 
determine who was collaborating with the SB in spying on society. This reform didn’t 
directly target the police apparatus, but was a wider initiative to politically condemn 
the old practices. The collaboration matter was extremely sensitive, but the lower 
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house of parliament issued a decision in 1992 that forced the interior ministry to 
release all the names of parliamentarians, officials, attorneys, and other public figures 
who were rendering secret services to the SB. After some resistance, the ministry 
revealed these names to parliament, yet the resulting debate did not lead to criminalize 
collaborators. The argument to avoid such criminalization was that a big part of the 
SB’s collaboration documents was destroyed from 1989-90. Hence, the revealed 
names were just a small portion of the collaborators; while some names were 
protected, others would be punished if lustration was strictly applied. Later on, in 
1995, a top politician was accused of collaboration with the Russians; this file was 
reopened, but this time, it was legally encountered. The parliament issued a new law 
in 1997 requiring governmental figures to present a report confirming or refuting their 
previous collaborations with the SB. This report was reviewed by the spokesman of 
the public interest to decide if they were eligible to stay in office or not. The lustration 
law did not criminalize actual collaboration with the SB, but rather only sent those 
who lied about their past to a lustration court (Grajewski, 2004). These procedures 
were definitely important in sharply breaking with the old practices of spying on 
society for the interest of the political regime. Despite the new State Protection office 
inheriting most of the old SB personnel, new practices were applied to oversee the 
office’s work. However, in 1993, the British MI5 revealed the Polish State Protection 
office’s illegal involvement in the arming of Irish terrorist groups. Therefore, the 
Polish parliament created a permanent parliamentary committee in 1995 to oversee 
the secret operations conducted by the special services affiliated to the State 
Protection office (Grajewski, 2004).    
Additionally, the new police law introduced directly after the transition made it 
possible to sue police officers who committed human rights violations. Accordingly, 
low-ranked officers were exempted from punishment if they were ordered by their 
seniors to commit unlawful practices, while the senior officers who ordered these 
practices could be convicted with a five-year jail sentence. Police officers could also 
be subject to judicial trials for corruption or harming national interests, and police 
officers who violently dealt with prisoners in custody could be punished with a three 
to five year sentence, or even more if the violence led to death (NDI, 2008).  
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This law empowered the work of the ombudsman that was formed in 1987, before 
the transition, and made it possible to better investigate human rights abuses and sue 
the perpetrators. The ombudsman was in charge of receiving and investigating 
complaints of human rights violations on both the local and national level. Yet its 
main procurement was the dissemination of human rights culture and the belief that 
every public official is accountable for his/her actions.  
4. Challenges 
The transformation of the Polish militia to a professional police force faced several 
challenges, but the most important obstacle was replacing the large number of 
dismissed experienced officers with inexperienced young recruits. Despite the 
intensive training they received in western countries, the newly-recruited officers’ 
lack of effectiveness held back police performance as a whole.  In addition, the 
transformation time was an occasion for high rates of crimes, which conflicted with 
people's expectation of seeing professional police officers taking control. 
Additionally, the need to decentralize the police, in order to democratize it and render 
it more accountable to the people contradicted with the inability of the localities to 
fund their police budgets, which allowed corruption to escalate. Before 1999, local 
police forces were allowed to receive donations from different entities, which opened 
the door for organized crime organizations to pay for their immunity, despite 
conducting illegal activity. The police was also widely understaffed, since a large 
number of officers preferred to work in private security companies or joined 
international missions abroad. This tendency was primarily caused by the low salaries 
of police personnel, compared to the other opportunities in the security field 
elsewhere. At large, the polish experience mainly proved that good police reform 
should rest on the will of a strong, democratic, ruling political coalition. (Oliver & 
Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006) 
D- South Africa 
1. Context 
South Africa suffered long decades of apartheid, when the police was the regime's 
tool to oppress the population. Therefore, the milestone of the democratic process in 
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the post-apartheid era was a police reform plan that was collectively formulated by 
different political actors. Between the 1940s and early 1990s, South African police 
was administratively divided to serve 11 conglomerations called "homelands," where 
white police officers comprised around 90% of the forces and black officers made up 
only 10%. Additionally, black officers were given authority over their black 
conglomerations only, and did not enjoy full police membership. Black officers were 
not allowed to give orders to white officers, and they were never promoted to higher 
ranks. Moreover, police work in the black conglomerations consisted merely of 
preserving the public order and countering insurgency, while the real police work in 
terms of fighting crime was applied only in the white conglomerations. Thus, the 
major goal of the reform was to include more black officers within the post-apartheid 
police apparatus, to make it more representative and trusted by the population (Pruitt, 
2010).   
2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform 
In the South African experience, there was a strong belief that successful 
democratization should involve a respective radical change in the police. Thus, 
following apartheid, a negotiated transition allowed the drafting of a new doctrine for 
the police to change its conceptions, organization, and tactics. The main goal in 
reforming the police was to replace its bad image of partners in crime and oppression, 
with the new image of being protectors of the totality of the people, without 
discrimination. Hence, the priority for the first strategic paper introduced by the new 
police in 1994 was to build the legitimacy of the new apparatus by enlarging its 
representation of the population and through community policing on the local level. 
Nevertheless, the strategy of building legitimacy was not successful enough in 
countering the growing level of crime, which urged the government in 1998 to switch 
its focus from legitimacy to fighting crime by applying tougher methods (Shaw, 
2002). This shift of focus was quite significant, especially as it enjoyed a high level of 
public support and opened large debates about different aspects of democratic 
policing, other than building legitimacy (Altbeker, 2009). The new president built the 
government’s legitimacy in 1998 on a crime fighting plan that was adopted by the 
police to correct its previous deficiencies. Accordingly, the police received financial 
and capacity-building assistance from different local donors. Among them business 
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groups that were interested in protecting their respective interests as well as a group of 
local vigilantes that was mostly active in black and poorer neighborhoods. Police 
unions were also active in promoting police professionalism and overcoming 
inequalities among officers (Pruitt, 2010).  
3. Reform Initiatives  
Between 1990 and 1994, the police introduced two main reforms to help purify its 
image, before negotiations decided on a police new doctrine. The first reform was to 
create a separate, internal stability division to preserve public order from potential 
tensions produced by the enemies of the negotiations. This attempt aimed at saving 
the efforts and time of the station-level police to help build their capacities in fighting 
crimes. The second reform targeted the Security Branch (SB), which was in charge of 
internal intelligence, and placed it under the authority of the investigations division. 
Both reforms were orchestrated by police managers who expected the enemy of the 
past- the opposition- to come and rule over them, and so these reforms were intended 
to appease general protests against the police (Shaw, 2002).    
In 1994, negotiations about police reform arrived at many recommendations that 
were later issued as the green paper of the ministry of safety and security. The new 
police doctrine prioritized the establishment of new legitimacy for the police, to gain 
the people’s trust after so many years of being the enforcer of apartheid.  The doctrine 
also allowed the police to decide on the reform’s implementation plan. This was 
effected because no members of the African National Congress (the main opposition 
movement accessing power in 1994 elections) were in police cadres or had the 
necessary expertise to carry out the reforms. Therefore, they preferred to design the 
general features of the reform and give the police leadership the authority to 
implement them on their own. Hence, the option of dismissing a large number of 
police officers and replacing them with new recruits was never put on the negotiation 
table. The doctrine also allowed old police personnel to preserve their jobs, out of the 
fear that they would protest if dismissed, and requested those who had committed 
major violations to ask for amnesty in return for the truth about what had taken place.  
The officers involved in violations were asked to testify in details about the past in 
return for forgiveness and the continuity of their careers. Thus, the Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a means to avoid accountability, and served as 
a vehicle for old personnel to be reappointed in return for their publicized break with 
the past (Altbeker, 2009). Accordingly, the new South African Police Service (SAPS) 
preserved the same leadership as the old South African Police (SAP). This decision 
resulted in the problem of there being no new blood injected into the police 
leadership. Yet, this leadership was obviously lacking the required skills to implement 
such reforms (Shaw, 2002). 
Another important outcome was the decision to centralize police authority in order 
to impose the new reforms equally on all police stations, in all provinces; otherwise, a 
decentralized police could easily be dragged into local political conflicts. Moreover, 
the police's uniforms, ranking, and organization were changed to signal a clear break 
from the past. The police demographically changed, since the black constables who 
served in the black conglomerations/townships were promoted and included as full 
members of the SAPS. This actually increased the representativeness of the police, 
but also hampered its effectiveness, since these new officers received only six-weeks 
of training and were widely illiterate. On the other hand, generous retirement 
packages were offered to decrease white personnel. But this policy caused many 
problems, since the leaders/managers were usually the most experienced, while the 
recently recruited or promoted were not.  Such a problem was also exacerbated when 
black officers were rapidly promoted in the SAPS hierarchy for the mere necessity of 
creating equilibrium between the white and black components of the leadership 
(Pruitt, 2010). Hence, problems of antagonism in the work place and double standards 
in promotion policies affected police performance. Additionally, some argued that the 
less competent, newly-recruited black officers were responsible for the ineffectiveness 
of the post-apartheid police apparatus (Altbeker, 2009). 
In an important organizational step, the police decided in 1996 to dismantle the 
503 specialized investigations units and place their personnel in local police stations. 
This decision aimed to enhance the investigational skills at the station level in order to 
help police forces solve crimes in different provinces without turning to the national 
authority (Shaw, 2002). As a result, local police commissioners had higher authority 
over detectives, which sparked a kind of decentralization of authority, thus increasing 
police accountability. However, some argued that this decision fragmented police’s 
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investigation capacities and harmed the independence that detectives should have vis-
à-vis police commissioners on the local level (Altbeker, 2009).   
Another attempt to enhance the investigative capacities of the police was the 
establishment of a new investigation apparatus called the Scorpions, which was 
placed under the authority of the justice ministry. The new apparatus, announced by 
the president in 1999, recruited the most skilled detectives and succeeded in building 
a good reputation of solving cases in a short period. It generally applied a 
combination of skills involving policing, prosecution, and intelligence to counter 
crimes (Shaw, 2002). Some analysts argued that the new investigation apparatus 
created a kind of duplication within the justice system, especially as it was not 
affiliated with the ministry of safety and security, which they said created a new 
source of police confusion. Nevertheless, other analysts saw it as a means of fruitful 
competition that would motivate the police, especially in terms of enhancing the 
investigation units’ capacity to fight crime.  
In all cases, this competition led the police to apply tougher methods in countering 
and tracking crimes. These methods consisted primarily of more military-like 
crackdown operations in towns and areas with the highest crime rates. The 
crackdowns relied heavily on armed forces applying road blocking, search operations, 
and cordons. These kinds of operations had, by definition, proven short-term success 
in arresting criminals and clearing criminal focal areas. However, a long-term process 
was still needed to enhance station-level police capacities to fight crime, and not just 
force its movement from one area to another according to the location of the police 
operations (Show, 2002). Additionally, these operations widely contradicted the 
community policing philosophy that should guide station-level police in building 
bridges of trust and understanding with the local population (Altbeker, 2009).   
In parallel with these professional procedures to enhance police capacities, other  
accountability measures were applied to help monitor the police’s respect of the new 
doctrine. At the top of these procedures was the appointment of a civilian as safety 
and security minister directly after the end of apartheid. This new minister arrived 
with a group of civilians, mostly lawyers and academics, to assist him in formulating 
policy and monitoring its implementation. The group was later institutionalized in 
52 
 
1996 as a civilian secretariat whose rank on the national level was equal to the head of 
the SAPS. These secretariats, established on both national and provincial levels, were 
largely in charge of monitoring the respect of police standards and promoting their 
accountability to civilian authority. However, such a civilian leadership created a 
duality within the ministry, particularly angering the head of the SAPS and creating 
conflict between the ministry’s civilian and police leadership (Shaw, 2002) 
Moreover, the SAPS embraced the community policing philosophy on the 
provincial level to gain the community's trust and address its needs closely. Such a 
philosophy was implemented through appointing a special officer in each police 
department nationwide to organize community policing forums (CPF). These CPFs 
were formed by unelected community representatives who met regularly to talk with 
the police about the community’s needs and security-related issues (Shaw, 2002). 
However, the CPF encountered two main problems. First, the officers were not 
culturally open to execute what the community requested, which hampered the 
credibility of these channels. Second, the CPFs had minor impact on day-to-day 
policing since the officers were accountable to their seniors in the central police 
hierarchy and not to provincial communities or local authorities (Altbeker, 2009).  
Interestingly, police unions were active in reporting police officers' wrongdoings. 
These unions were unofficially formed in 1989 by reformist police officers, and were 
then increased after apartheid. They focused on complaining about poor work  
conditions, the slow transformation of the SAPS, and the lack of equality in terms of 
work opportunities. They were also particularly active in shedding light on several 
cases of police brutality, especially those conducted against blacks and which 
exemplified the continuity of racism (Shaw, 2002). The unions also embraced the 
community-policing approach in supporting the new legitimacy of the SAPS and 
enhancing its professionalism (Pruitt, 2010).  
Among other reforms that were considered to enhance the degree of police 
accountability was the application of new rules for the use of firearms. Previously 
during the apartheid, officers were granted the right to shoot to disperse unlawful 
gatherings, without even issuing warnings. It was also legal to shoot to kill a fleeing 
suspect if there was no other way to arrest him, a prerogative that was largely misused 
53 
 
by police officers. Thus, the new law prohibited the use of firearms unless there was a 
real threat to the officer or any other citizen's life (Pruitt, 2010).   
In line with these new regulations, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) 
was established in 1995 under the authority of the safety and security ministry to 
investigate any police abuse or brutality. The ICD was formed of civilian personnel, 
with several braches on the national and provincial level. It has since investigated the 
thousands of cases of death in police custody and police brutality cases that occur 
each year (Shaw, 2002). Despite the ICD’s authority to issue recommendations to the 
relevant police commissioner, it is not empowered to make the police act upon them 
(Burger & Adonis 2008). Nevertheless, the ICD's mission of holding the police 
accountable to civilian authorities and constitutional norms has been relatively 
successful. It also gives regular citizens the ability to access relevant information held 
by the police (Pruitt, 2010).   
Beside these accountability measures, the courts played an important role in 
correcting police deviations by refusing to adopt any evidence obtained by cruel 
methods. Such a procedure eventually helped change police culture about brutality 
being an effective method to solve cases (Pruitt, 2010). On the other hand, the 
adoption of crackdown operations to combat crime in the short run resulted in prisons 
being overcrowded with suspects waiting to be tried. In this regard, the government 
was obliged to implement a collective commutation, releasing around 24,000 
prisoners with shorter sentences to allow room for newly-convicted prisoners 
(Altbeker, 2009).    
4. Challenges 
Generally, South Africa’s police reform was centralized and highly developed in 
rhetoric that referred to international literature of COP and problem-oriented policing 
(POP), but was less articulate in terms of implementation. The centrality of the police 
limited the reforms to superficial changes and the continuity of old police leaders 
prevented the reforms from penetrating to the core of the service. The truth and 
reconciliation commission was a good driver for change in terms of police culture and 
philosophy, but it weakened the accountability mechanisms and reinserted human 
rights violators into the police apparatus. This fact increased the probability of the 
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violations' reoccurrence on a smaller scale. The community policing applied in each 
of the nine provinces were found to be deficient since the central organization of the 
service left little room for innovation and oversight on the local level (Altbeker, 
2009). Moreover, there was an inclination towards old police techniques involving 
brutality and disrespect for human rights in order to achieve high crime-fighting 
statistics (Pruitt, 2010). Some of these cases were investigated by the ICD, which 
worked every year on around 5,000 cases, while others were left unchecked due to the 
ICD’s limited resources. Additionally, the fact that the ICD reported to the minister of 
safety and security, who was also in charge of the police service, made it almost 
impossible for the minister to tackle any of the police abuse cases (Burger & Adonis 
2008).  
In general, police reform in South Africa was collectively planned with great 
political consensus. However, the implementation of the plan was widely unbalanced, 
with legitimacy building given more weight than crime fighting. Therefore, when the 
new reforms were later introduced to correct the initial plan, the new police's 
legitimacy had already been affected by inefficiency. Also, the different stockholders 
participating in the reform plan distracted its priority list, making it a good idea on 
paper, but with little tangible results on the ground (Shaw, 2002). Finally, it is 
important to highlight that given the economic difficulties and the inefficiency of the 
whole justice system, the task of crime reduction was not the responsibility of the 
police alone. The crime reduction strategy should incorporate alternative economic 
chances and a parallel reform of the justice system to ensure that those in prison have 
access to quick and fair trials. Meanwhile, police violence is still considered as a 
factor of crime reduction. Still accountability mechanisms are playing on the opposite 
side to reverse this conviction and consolidate the respect of the constitutional norms.  
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VI- Assessing the Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt 
In this chapter, the Egyptian context of potential police reform is introduced in 
order to clarify the political environment which determines its design and 
implementation. Generally, the approach of democratic policing entails many norms 
and criteria. Only four of these norms are discussed here, however, to examine the 
extent to which they are absent/ present in the Egyptian context and what challenges 
they face in terms of being accomplished. The four norms of interest to this chapter 
are the political neutrality of the police, the de-militarization of its structures and 
tactics, the professionalism of its methods, and the accountability of its personnel to 
civilian oversight. These norms will be thoroughly examined to specify the different 
conditions defining their potential occurrence and their evolution in the Egyptian 
context. But first, a historical overview of the Egyptian police is introduced to reflect 
its general evolution in the light of the four democratic policing norms. 
A-Historical Overview  
Historians have registered an exceptional stance of a police chief under the authority 
of Ramses III during Pharaonic times. This police chief refused to oppress a strike 
since he was convinced that the workers have the right to request their withheld 
salaries. Rather than ending the strike with force, the chief endorsed their demands in 
front of the Pharaoh until they received their salaries (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.42). 
However, such an attitude reflecting the true nature of a politically neutral police is 
almost exceptional in Egyptian history. The Egyptian police are known in modern 
history as a direct tool to repress the people for the interest of the political regime. 
This has been clear during significant moments of popular mobilization against the 
political authority. For instance, during the 1919 revolution, the police was heavily 
applied to prosecute and intimidate political militants, especially those affiliated with 
the Wafd Party. The police was also systematically deployed to forcibly disperse any 
demonstration conducted by peasants to protest the high rents imposed by feudal 
families on their rented lands (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.52).   
In this context, the political bureau was officially established in 1922 to prosecute 
Egyptians resisting British occupation, and it was later applied against all types of 
political activism (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.53). In this regard, the police was complicit 
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in the political and economic alliances of the rulers. But on January 25, 1952, an 
exceptional incident happened in Ismailia, when the Egyptian police director refused 
to surrender and turn over his men's weapons to a British force. The police force 
chose to fight, and died defending Egyptian sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Ismailia 
police force’s stance had been agreed upon by the interior minister at the time, Fouad 
Serageldine, the emblematic nationalist figure of the Wafd Party. As a former officer 
explained:  
The most obvious patriotic and honorable deed done by the Egyptian police was in 
this incident, yet it was not out of their own initiative, they were following the order 
of the interior minister, who was a civilian at the time (Telephone interview with a 
former officer, February 2015) 
Accordingly, after the July 1952 revolution, the police doctrine slightly changed to 
agree with the new regime’s alignment with the lower classes, especially peasants and 
workers. This shift nearly ended police brutality against these classes, and a new type 
of relationship was initiated with citizens, based on the principles of dignity and 
respect. Nevertheless, the political militants opposing the regime of Gamal Abdel-
Nasser continued to face political prosecution, arbitrary detention, and torture in 
custody. Despite the official abolition of the political bureau in 1952, it was shortly 
replaced with the General Investigations Department, which along with the military 
police was in charge of politically based prosecutions. Both apparatuses were 
involved in the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, the prominent opposition 
movement to the Nasser regime (T. Aclimandos, 2012, p.2). In the last years of 
Nasser's rule, the military was less involved in political affairs, letting the State 
Security Investigations (ISS), created in 1968, take the lead in this regard (B. 
Abdelaziz, 2013, p.55). Under Nasser’s rule, police violence targeted only political 
opponents within police headquarters, and was not generalized against the whole 
population. One exception occurred on February 21, 1968, when police used firearms 
to disperse students protesting the lack of accountability of military leaders after 
Egypt’s 1967 defeat to Israel. Several causalities were registered (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, 
p.57). From this incident came the need to create the Central Security Forces (CSF) in 
1969 to control mass demonstrations. The CSF began with only 189 officers and 
around 11,690 soldiers, and increased in number until it contained around 300,000 in 
Mubarak's era (O. Ashour, 2012, p. 7). Accordingly, during the rule of Anwar Sadat 
and then Mubarak, the SSI became the most prominent police department, influencing 
57 
 
appointments in public offices, intimidating political opponents, orienting media 
outlets, and forging election results. The SSI was largely involved in electoral fraud 
for the interest of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) on different 
occasions. 
Concerning the demilitarization, police structures were quite distinct from those of 
the military in ancient Egypt. The army had the well-defined task of defending the 
country while the police was in charge of preserving internal security and order within 
society. The police structures were even diversified to focus on certain segments such 
as the Nile River, temples, and public order within cities. Therefore, the police was 
directly under the authority of the minister, who was the second highest authority after 
the Pharaoh himself (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.40). However, during the different periods 
of occupation to which Egypt was subjected, the idea of a civilian police completely 
changed. Starting from the Ptolemaic era, the police was widely mixed with the 
military corps, which has entirely changed the police's function. As a military force, 
soldiers were trained to resist the country's enemies or enforce the rule of an 
occupying authority. The police force was trained to protect citizens from crime and 
widespread insecurities as well as preserve the public order (B. Abdelaziz 2013, p. 43 
& 46). Hence, when the police's role was joined with military personnel and their 
respective tactics, the civilian nature of the police was altered.  
Such a policy prevailed during the different phases of occupation that Egypt 
witnessed. However, the establishment of the police force in modern Egypt reflected a 
gradual orientation of distinguishing the police from the military corps. When 
Mohamed Ali founded a modern police force, it was mainly comprised of military 
soldiers who followed the command of a specific high ranking officer assigned for 
internal security. Later in the era of Khedive Ismail, the police force became more 
independent from military personnel, but it still relied on military officers who 
received some legal knowledge before working as police officers (M. Youssef, 2014).  
The first school to train police officers in Egypt was established in 1896 and was 
led by a British officer. The school enrolled youth at early age, with priority for those 
who finished high school. In 1914, the school began only enrolling high school 
graduates for two years, and law school graduates for one year. In 1946, the length 
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was expanded from two to four years, and in 1953, it began issuing graduates with a 
law degree in addition to a policing degree (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 34-35). Such an 
evolution addressed the need to provide police graduates with legal knowledge and 
other soft tools, rather than just the weapons they carried. Although Nasser himself 
was appointed interior minister right after the 1952 revolution, and was followed by 
other ministers with a military background, the police chain of command and its 
personnel were clearly distinct from the military. Then, in 1975, a police academy 
was created to include the police college, for bachelor degree in law and policing, the 
high education college for master's and doctorate's degrees and the college of training 
and development for post-graduate training diplomas (Babawi, 2005).   
B-Political Neutrality 
Political neutrality means the existence of a professional police force which is able to 
serve the whole population equally, without specific preference or animosity towards 
any component of society. This neutrality should especially apply to the relationship 
between the police and the political and economic elites. Therefore, police work 
should reflect the rule of law, without exception.   
Ashour (2012) compares the SSI to the brains protecting the regime, while the CSF 
was the muscles forcibly executed this protection. The SSI included several 
departments in charge of close surveillance for political, religious, and student 
activism, as well as syndicates, churches, and NGO activities. As one former officer 
explained:  
the SSI agency under Mubarak was no longer doing its essential role in 
protecting the country. It kept shifting its role until it became responsible for 
all the mess that happened in Egypt… the officers were doing their job and 
working for long hours more than expected … but some bad people among 
them, including the head of the agency, were positioning the agency to do 
other missions than really protecting the country. (Telephone interview with 
a former police officer, February 2015) 
This pattern of unification between the police and the political regime has deeply 
damaged the norm of police neutrality in Egypt. The police are no longer protecting 
citizens but rather endorsing the regime's viability. Therefore, the minor attempt of 
any officer to reinitiate political neutrality by refusing to be involved in the electoral 
fraud (in the interest of the NDP) was violently repressed. Moreover, the police 
academy recruited from a certain social level that would eventually be aligned with 
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the political regime. Candidates with any political or religious affiliations are 
systematically excluded, specifically those related to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
graduates of Al-Azhar University, while Coptic Christians currently represent no 
more than 2% of the accepted candidates to the police academy (T. Aclimandos, 
2012, p.8).    
 The politicization of police work transcended the SSI and the CSF to other 
police departments, since the whole police apparatus was applied to serve the political 
status of the regime. Unlike during Nasser's era, police brutality now affected 
ordinary citizens who had no connection to politics. In addition to the CSF's constant 
deployment to forcibly disperse workers' strikes, the police could also apply violence 
and torture against someone as a favor for another fortunate citizen who held some 
kind of authority. Accordingly, police brutality was applied to simply urge someone 
to withdraw a complaint he had previously filed against an officer (B. Abdelaziz, 
2013, p.74, p88). An emblematic case of this was Khaled Said, who was beaten to 
death by sub-officers in June 2010, an event that served as the necessary spark to 
build wide consensus against police brutality. Khaled Said was completely apolitical, 
yet he was not spared from police violence. Such an incident crystallized public 
opinion against police practices, reflected in reactive violence that targeted police 
symbols and personnel. Police officers and soldiers were verbally and physically 
attacked on the streets, and more than 95 police stations and around 4,000 police 
vehicles were burned during the first few days of the 2011 revolution (O. Ashour, 
2012, p.9).    
The constant politicization of the police led officers to use violence for political 
reasons, and then to use general violence to settle their conflicts with ordinary people, 
until finally they were themselves the target of the people's violence and protests 
against the political regime. However, police neutrality is not completely politics-free, 
meaning that democratic policing cannot be implemented without a solid political 
will. Therefore, when the interior ministry's leaders were replaced during the rule of 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), there was no political will to 
introduce deep changes into the equation of a politicized police force. The police 
remained the tool of the political regime to weaken its political opposition, regardless 
of who was actually in power (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p.11). This applies to the SCAF 
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between February 2011 and June 2012, and then as well to the presidency of Morsi, 
until he was removed from power in June 2013. As one human rights expert 
explained:  
Lots of opportunities were lost. We had an opportunity right after the revolution; we 
had another one during the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in 2011; and a third one 
right after the Port Said massacre in February 2012, and then right after Morsi's 
election in mid 2012. But all these opportunities were wasted; those who were in 
power were keen to support the Ministry of interior- MOI and not reform it. For three 
years, we had no real political will to reform the police, yet the political opportunity 
to push for reforms was very real and could have made a difference. Today [after 
July 3
rd
, 2013] , it is very hard to impose reform on the police. (Personal interview 
with a human rights expert, March 2015)  
The events of Portsaid’s stadium constituted another opportunity. Therefore, I blame 
the Muslim brotherhood for wasting this chance because they were in the parliament 
by then. They were capable of doing anything to reform. The MOI was weak after 
this failure, the street was protesting for a week in front of the MOI’s headquarters. 
In these circumstances, the discontent with the MOI was wider than the political elite 
circle because the event was touching a bigger part of the society. (Personal interview 
with a security studies researcher, February 2015) 
Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) majority in parliament held back on 
police reform initiatives and passed only a few amendments to raise police salaries 
right before the parliament dissolution.  In return, some MB supporters were accepted 
at the police academy, while some anti-MB officers at the National Security agency 
were excluded (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 18-19). However, we cannot say that 
Morsi's politicization of the police resulted in greater control over its ranks. During 
the protests in front of the presidential palace Ittihādiya in December 2012, following 
the issuance of a constitutional declaration by the president that immunized his 
decisions from potential appeals, the police refused to suppress the masses. Hence, the 
MB's leaders were obliged to bring their own youth to disperse the sit-in, which 
resulted in violence known as the Ittihādiya clashes. Nevertheless when the MOI's 
headquarters were approached by protestors a month earlier on Mohamed Mahmoud 
Street, police forces used excessive violence to defend the building. Such an attitude 
reflected that the Police were motivated to defend their own headquarters but they 
were not willing to repress the masses to consolidate the President's power. This 
tendency was the main reason for Morsi to appoint a new interior minister, with 
Mohamed Ibrahim replacing Ahmed Gamal El-Din (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 24-25). 
Later on, the police refused again to align with the President's will on the eve of June 
30, 2013 protests, but this time the refusal emerged from mid- and low-ranking 
officers. As a former officer explains:  
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there were clear orders from the minister to launch an arrest campaign against the 
media and the youth leaders supporting the anti-Morsi Tamarrod (Rebel) movement, 
but the reformist mid- and low-ranking officers refused to execute these orders, 
defying the minister and the president and preferring instead to align with the masses.  
(Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)    
In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the political and military elites had no 
interest in de-politicizing the police, thinking that they would eventually use the 
apparatus when needed to diminish any future opposition. From their side, police 
officers did not unconditionally align themselves with the ruling political elite; rather, 
they were in continuous negotiations to extract more benefits for their own interests. 
Nevertheless, they were not able to restrain from taking part in the political conflict, 
since they were aware that the January 25
th
 revolution was more or less against them, 
and hence they were personally motivated to oppose it. Some police officers were 
individually inclined to avoid meddling in politics again, in order to secure their status 
in the long run. But on the other hand, when interior minister Habib Al-Adly and his 
deputies were dismissed and brought to justice in 2011, police officers refused to 
work to protest the humiliation and detainment of their leaders (Brumberg & Sallam, 
2012, p 7). In addition, although the police stayed neutral vis-à-vis the June 30 rallies 
in 2013, they were motivated to suppress the pro-Morsi protestors few days later. 
Such an attitude reflected the police's political preference in removing Morsi rather 
than a consistent neutral stance towards political demonstrations in general. Thus, this 
continuing police politicization could not be resolved without a certain level of 
politics or political will to force a re-orientation of the police, from a coercive 
apparatus to a politically neutral law-enforcement body (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p 
13). Such a process is closely related to the status of a country's democratization and 
the balance of power among different political actors (Sedra & Burt, 2011, p.3).        
C- De-militarization  
One of the main principles of democratic policing is the civilian nature of the police. 
The police should not rely on its capabilities as a force but as a civilian service. The 
police structure and command should be ultimately distinct from those of the military. 
Accordingly, police techniques and working methods should be civilized in order to 
serve the people and not fight them. Moreover, the militarization of the police is a 
point of weakness for its legitimacy in the eyes of the local community and stands as 
an impediment to gain the people's trust (Friesendorf & Krempel, 2011) 
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Egypt has known an early distinction between the military and the police forces. 
Nevertheless, the police force was forged on the military model in many aspects. The 
officers' rankings, uniforms, military salutes, firearms, fighting training, and the 
military life, especially in the police school, all came from the army. The militarized 
nature of the police was further deepened by the creation of the Central Security 
Forces (CSF) in the late 1960s. According to ministerial decree number 31, issued by 
the defense minister in 1981, the MOI is considered a military entity through which 
military conscripts can serve their duty (M. Mahfouz, 2011, p. 118). Such a decree 
contradicts the police's nature as specified in consecutive constitutions as a "statutory 
civil body" (Egyptian Constitution, 2014, art. 206). Therefore, the CSF included 
thousands of young Egyptian males who served their military duty under the authority 
of the interior ministry. Generally, these conscripts had not received any basic 
education and were mainly trained to obey the orders of their superiors (Brumberg & 
Sallam, 2012, pp.8-9). However, the CSF is not the only paramilitary force within the 
MOI that receives military conscripts. As a former officer who served in these forces 
explained, the paramilitary forces in the MOI are divided into three main forces:     
The first one is called the services forces. These serve as guards in front of banks, 
post offices and the traffic regulation authority. They are soldiers of the second 
degree; I mean they are not the best degree. They follow the authority of the security 
directorates, so these are the Security Forces (SF) which are organized locally. The 
second force type is the Central Security Forces (CSF) which are divided into the 
anti-riot forces and the fighting groups. The anti-riot forces are deployed in soccer 
matches, protests, sit-ins, and so on, and are organized into divisions. Each contains 
almost 110 soldiers, which are also divided into three divisions, with 33 soldiers 
each, plus two to four officers and two to four sub-officers, as well as soldiers as 
guards for the chiefs of the division. These are equipped with only tear gas bombs 
and some cartridge rifles; they do not carry any firearms, except the personal guns of 
the officers and the guns of the chief's guards. The last type of forces is the best in 
terms of weapons, equipment, and the quality of the soldiers. They are called the 
fighting groups, or the support groups, and are the ones who actually fight in 
dangerous situations. They serve in arrests of dangerous criminals, and in anti-
narcotic, counter-terrorism, and state security missions. They are organized into five 
soldiers, with only one officer. They have other type of weapons, rifles or automatic 
weapons, and now they are all wearing masks and dressed all in black. (Telephone 
interview with a former officer, February 2015) 
The total numbers of these forces grew extensively from 189 officers and 11,690 
soldiers in 1968, to around 300,000 officers and soldiers by the end of Mubarak's rule 
(O. Ashour, 2012, p.7).  Hence, these forces are the flagrant symbol of a militarized 
police, due to their paramilitary-like structure and the military conscripts that they 
enroll. However such a mixture with the military was never the same on the 
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leadership level. Accordingly, military leaders and commanders were always spared 
by the regime from police work, especially in Mubarak's rule, fearing the possibility 
of coups if they were too involved in the internal affairs. Therefore, the Egyptian 
people looked up to the military as a protector while considering the police, with all 
its brutality and misconduct, as threat. Such a perception was extremely obvious on 
the eve of January 29, 2011, when police forces were chased from streets, while the 
military forces were widely welcomed and saluted by protestors (El-Houdaiby, 2013, 
p.8 & p.4). 
Another problem with Egypt's militarized police is that its effectiveness widely 
depends on the crackdown operations led by paramilitary forces. This matter was 
entrenched in police tradition during Mubarak's rule and then continued after his 
ouster. Starting from the early 1980s, the crackdown operations on specific areas such 
as villages, neighborhoods, or other conglomerations became more and more 
frequent. They were widely initiated for different reasons, most of them political 
rather than criminal. Generally, paramilitary forces impose a closure over a targeted 
area, with tight searches of homes and, in some cases, burning houses, electricity cuts, 
and transportation deprivations (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 65-66). These types of 
operations continued after the revolution, but were widely accompanied by military 
forces for different reasons. First, the police was endorsed by the military as a way to 
renew its legitimacy following the withdrawal of the police from the streets on the eve 
of January 29, 2011. Second, the military was perceived as being better equipped and 
trained to enforce the law in the short term. Hence, several crackdown operations 
have been initiated jointly by military and police forces since 2011 to break up 
criminal or terrorist strongholds, especially in Sinai. The same case applied to 
Kerdasa, in Giza, where clashes between the police and armed groups led to the 
burning of the police station and the killing of police forces right after the Nahda and 
Rabi'a dispersals in August 2013. Shortly after the clashes, the town of Kerdasa was 
subjected to collective punishment by military and police forces, rather than precise 
criminal investigations to specify the real perpetrators of the violence. Such a heavy-
handed and broad response eventually served as an impetus to increase terrorist 
attacks against state forces, rather than stabilizing the country or enforcing the law 
(Moheyeldeen, 2014, pp. 6-9).      
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The tight cooperation between the military and the police in these crackdown 
operations does not reflect, however, smooth interactions between the two 
institutions. Under Mubarak's rule, the MOI gained more importance in internal and 
political affairs, when the military was generally distanced from the political scene. 
Therefore, the MOI was a close partner to the NDP and the ruling elite surrounding 
the president's son, Gamal Mubarak, who was planning to inherent his office. In this 
context, the MOI's authority was widened to defy the military's in some aspects. For 
instance, the State Security Investigations (SSI) enlarged its surveillance activity to 
include military officers (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.10). As an ex-officer stated: 
Under Habib El-Adly's rule, the officer of state security in Ismailia, for instance, 
might have greater authority than the commander of the second field army. 
(Telephone Interview with an ex-officer, February 2015) 
Therefore, the MOI was a sort of a defying power to the military, relying on the 
close relationship between El-Adly and Gamal Mubarak's circle. The military was 
motivated to take part in ousting Mubarak in 2011 to stop the inheritance project of 
Gamal and the ascending ambitions of the MOI. Afterwards, when the police needed 
support to redress its authority, the military was present to endorse police work for 
several months. The military police and other units supported police officers and CSF 
soldiers on different occasions. This support reflected a new type of relation between 
the two institutions, in which the military was superior to the police. Hence, the 
military was keen to assure its supremacy over the police, rather than emphasizing 
civilian supremacy over police work. However, this new relationship engendered two 
types of reactions among police officers. The first was a feeling of disappointment 
about their new inferior status to the military, which initiated many incidents of 
conflict on low-ranking levels between officers of the two institutions. An example 
occurred in November 2012, when several military officers surrounded a police 
station in east Cairo to protest the arrest of a military officer by a police officer at a 
checkpoint. Another incident occurred in October 2014 at a checkpoint on the 
Portsaid highway, when military police arrested all the police personnel who were 
present to punish them for mistreating a military officer who passed by the 
checkpoint. These incidents were usually settled through mediations, after the 
intervention of the leaders of the two institutions; yet, no punishment for the conflicts' 
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initiators was announced (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 13-11-2014). As a police officer 
explained:  
I believe the military has an upper hand over the police and the whole country. They 
have a veto authority, and if a police officer is mistaken, he must be punished for 
what he has done. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015) 
The second reaction was a sense of excessive identification with the military, 
which deepened the militarized nature of the police and made it require more weapons 
and armories. This was reflected in the self image of police officers and how they 
constantly compared themselves to military officers in terms of work conditions and 
career path. As one officer explained: 
We suffer from career stagnation. It takes us so long to be promoted from one rank to 
another. I wish we applied the same rules as the military or the intelligence. I wish 
we were equal to the military in everything. (Telephone interview with an officer, 
February 2015) 
Another officer went even further: 
I do not mind at all to be punished by jail if I commit a mistake, but I want to be tried 
in front of police courts and then imprisoned in special prisons for police officers, as 
with the military judiciary and military prisons. (Telephone interview with an officer, 
February 2015) 
There was an attempt to initiate special police courts in order to prosecute military 
conscripts serving their duty under the authority of the MOI, but Egypt's current 
president, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, refuted this suggestion by issuing a law in October 
2014 that assigned the military judiciary the right to try military conscripts from the 
MOI (Al-Badil, 9-10-2014). However, there was no confirmation about the inclusion 
of sub-officers in the decree, since they were previously exempted from military 
trials, thanks to a decree issued by the SCAF in April 2012 (Al-Youm Al-Sabae', 30-
4-2012).   
Another problem with the police's militarization is that it negatively impacts the 
effectiveness of law enforcement. A military officer is supposed to follow the orders 
of his superiors; in a military battle, the only law is the superiors' orders which are 
communicated to the soldiers. However,    police personnel must follow the law in 
order to preserve security and public order. Thus, when the police are militarized, 
officers ignore the law and instead turn to their superiors for orders. Such an attitude 
requires an extensive chain of coordination between police officers and their leaders 
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in each incident, which impedes and decelerates police performance. As one former 
officer describes it:  
When you face a situation, you do not think how to implement the law, but you turn 
to your superior for instructions, who then turns to his superiors, and so on.  So some 
situations would generate a series of phone calls ascending the hierarchy of the police 
in order to decide what to do. (M.H. Abulezz, 2014, p. 91) 
From its side, the military wanted to see the police take responsibility of internal 
security without really applying deep reforms. As previously mentioned, the 
amendments to the police law that were passed by parliament in June 2012, right 
before its dissolution, spared police sub-officers from  military courts. Hence, the 
police became more civilianized; yet, all other suggestions to audit the police and 
make it more accountable were ignored and marginalized. This was the result of 
mutual cooperation between the Islamist parliamentarian majority, namely the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the SCAF, which was held the authority of the president at 
the time (El-Houdaiby, 2013, pp. 10-16). Despite several new appointments of 
consecutive interior ministers, the substance of the militarized police did not changed, 
nor did the apparatus' security policy as a whole. Indeed, the SCAF's primary goal 
during its rule from February 2011 to June 2012 was the restoration of security and 
not its reformation (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.25). The same can also be said about 
Morsi's rule from June 2012 to July 2013, which emphasized the supply of new 
weapons rather than the introduction of a new doctrine and norms. Hence, the same 
militarized nature of the police prevailed and was more intensified after the ouster of 
Morsi and the dispersal of his supporters' sit-ins at Rabi'a and Nahda squares. The 
changed political environment following these incidents and the ascending militant 
attacks on the police and military served to justify and emphasize the militarization of 
the police. In this regard, the war on terrorism was jointly launched by the military 
and the police, especially in Sinai, with little room for boundaries to be defined and 
tasks to be specified. 
Moreover, after consecutive terrorist attacks, especially in Sinai, President El-Sisi 
issued a presidential decree in October 2014 assigning the military with some of the 
internal security tasks of the police for two years, especially in guarding vital 
institutions. Despite the several appeals against the decree for mixing the tasks of the 
military and the police, which are distinct by virtue of the constitution (Al-Shorouk, 
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10-3-2015), the decree stands, further deepening the problem of a militarized police in 
Egypt. 
 
D- Professionalism 
There are several aspects in which a democratic police force should be professional, 
in order to be effective and responsive to the people's needs. For example, a 
professional police force should receive suitable education and training to enable its 
personnel to solve cases without breaking the law or violating the basic rights of 
citizens. Also needed are the necessary tools of investigation and data analysis, which 
should be available to endorse the police's technical work in solving crimes. 
Meanwhile, the police's organizational culture should comply with official/written 
instructions and bylaws; otherwise, officers' performance will be impeded, with their 
motivations negatively affected. The motivational dimension of police work is very 
important, especially when considering work conditions, salaries, the force's 
organizational structure, and promotion criteria. Therefore, if suitably designed, these 
points can prevent inclinations towards corruption or police abuse. Additionally, a 
professional police should be supported with a network of police unions to promote 
the ethical code of the police officers, provide them with a positive organizational 
culture, and negotiate improvements in their work conditions.  
Most of the organizational structures and bylaws regulating the MOI were 
established right after the 1952 revolution. New police laws were consequently issued 
in 1955 and 1964, followed by the law of 1971, which has prevailed until today with 
few amendments. Additionally, most of the modernized systems within the MOI were 
introduced under the rule of Habib El-Adly (1997-2011). As a former officer stressed: 
On the contrary to all that was said about Habib El-Adly, he was the first minister to 
apply new methods and set new regulations for everything in the interior ministry. 
The people might hate him, but he was fair to us. He put rules and regulations for 
everything to make the job more institutionalized (. . .) He was an innovator. For 
instance, the simplest thing, the uniforms of the police forces, especially for low-
ranking soldiers, their uniform was a shame, and he set new rules to circulate new 
uniforms for the forces every year. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, 
February 2015) 
The MOI has widely shifted its interest from criminal security to purely political 
security, given the fact that El-Adly arrived primarily to fight terrorism after militants 
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massacred tourists in Luxor in 1997. The MOI consists of three major branches: 
public security, investigations, and central security. Public security consists of police 
stations and police patrols on the streets, while investigations are divided into several 
sub-departments, such as investigations for criminal acts, public funds, tax evasion 
and drugs.  In addition to the division for State Security Investigations (SSI) which in 
2011 was turned into the National Security Agency (NSA). The third branch is the 
central security sector, which manages the paramilitary forces of the MOI and is 
divided into anti-riot forces and fighting groups/special operation forces, as specified 
earlier. But due to the ascending politicization of the police in Egypt, the SSI, which 
was essentially a part of the investigations division, gained a decisive role and 
dominated other branches of the MOI, even including a paramilitary division to fight 
terrorism (personal interview with a former officer, February 2015). Apart from these 
major branches, the MOI is divided geographically into security directorates, and by 
specialization into social, economic, criminal, and political investigations
3
. Hence, 
there are two ways to evaluate police work, whether in terms of specialization or 
geography, but from each perspective, the channels of coordination and information 
sharing are quite unclear. Although the public security division does most of the 
police work and employs around two-thirds of police officers, it receives the fewest 
resources, equipment, and training (telephone interview with a former officer, 
February 2015). 
In addition to its role in ensuring the people's safety, the MOI is in charge of 
preserving public order and morality, protecting people's lives and property, and 
fighting crime and apprehending criminals (Said & Bakr, 2011, p.7). Moreover, the 
2014 constitution underlined the police's role in the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Article 206). However, the MOI does more than those tasks 
prescribed by consecutive constitutions and laws. It is in charge of issuing security 
approval for almost every kind of activity in the country, which is a hidden way to 
control who does what. Some specified authorities are in charge of organizing 
religious pilgrimages, as well as civil defense, civil records and passport issuance (O. 
Ashour, 2012, p.15). Therefore, the MOI's work infiltrates almost all types of activity 
                                                           
3
  For a detailed structural map of the interior ministry, visit the website: http://www.interior 
ministry.gov.eg/Arabic/Organization+Chart/ 
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on Egyptian soil, whether or not it is directly related to security affairs. As one former 
officer explained: 
In theory, the police's role should be to protect and serve the people, or more 
specifically, to do what cannot be done by others. I mean they have to protect the 
safety and security of the public, especially in terms of criminality. They should 
enable citizens to be safe to practice their ordinary daily lives and daily business. 
Their main job is to make sure that everyone abides by the laws legislated by 
parliament. But I think today the police are doing lots of things that are beyond their 
job description. They are burdened by other tasks that should not be their 
responsibility, which takes away their energy. For instance, civil registrations, 
passport authority, traffic and driving and vehicles' licenses, tax evasion authority… 
etc. (Telephone interview with a former police officer, February 2015) 
Another officer added: 
The police are not doing their main task of protecting the people's lives and 
properties; rather they are doing things that should be assigned to other authorities. 
(Personal interview with an officer, February 2015) 
In order to fulfill these multiple tasks, the MOI employs almost 1.5 million people, 
equal to  around 20% of the state's bureaucracy, divided into officers, sub-officers, 
conscripts, constables, and civilian personnel (Brumberg & Sallam 2012, p.6 / O. 
Ashour 2012, p.6). Around 830,000 of these positions are full-time jobs, while the rest 
consist of part-time, unofficial informants and collaborators. Hence, most of the 
growing budget of the MOI is invested to pay the salaries of this huge amount of 
personnel. According to official statistics, the interior ministry's budget amounts to 
almost LE23 billion, where LE19 billion is directed solely for salaries (Hashem 
2014). Other unofficial estimations suggest that the actual budget of the MOI could 
amount to approximately to LE85 billion (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Yet, the difference 
between the two numbers could come from the unofficial economic activity that the 
MOI undertakes. Such economic activity is probably managed by the high-ranking 
colonels in the minister's closed circle, and is used to fund the loyalty payments for 
the high ranks of the MOI. The disparity in salaries' between the higher and lower 
ranking personnel of the MOI creates a deep feeling of alienation among officers, and 
opens the door for corrupt practices that will be explained later in this section.    
Police candidates study three types of courses at the police academy. The first 
input comes from law school courses, public law, importantly. The second input is 
related to policing, which is divided into two sub-groups, theoretical courses and 
practical courses. The first subgroup is related to crime scene investigations, forensic 
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evidence, psychology, and human rights. Under the second subgroup, candidates are 
taught practical courses focusing on physical fitness, such as swimming, shooting, 
horse riding, boxing, climbing, martial arts, and self defense (interview with a former 
officer, February 2015). As one freshly graduated officer explained, not all studied 
courses are really useful in one's daily work: 
I do not know why we were studying all the law school curricula, they were not 
useful except for the sharia law and the criminal law, as I think, but all the other 
courses are not related to our job. (Email interview with an officer, March 2015) 
Other officers said they studied theoretical work techniques that were 
inapplicable in real work upon graduation. 
We learned some useful courses, like for instance crime scene investigation. They 
taught us how we should enter the scene with our hands in our pocket to make sure 
we do not touch anything until the criminal lab guys are there collecting evidences 
and taking fingerprints. But in reality, when I graduated and worked in 
investigations, we had no criminal lab at all. So, even the limited stuff that was useful 
and might be used was wasted by the limited resources and the sad reality that you 
face after graduation. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)  
The resources are extremely limited. The equipment of the criminal lab is only 
present in Cairo and Alexandria, and they cannot serve in all cases, because this 
would take time and delay the transfer of the case to the prosecutors. (Telephone 
interview with an officer, February 2015) 
The equipment is available but not working. I mean there is a special officer assigned 
to criminal evidence, but here is the problem. If I am an investigation officer in a 
police station, I receive daily around 20 reports of theft - some are cars and 
apartments, others are forced theft, and so on. Generally, the criminal lab is not 
working, except for the big cases, like a murder of a celebrity, but a regular theft of 
an apartment, they do not even ask for the criminal lab to come and see the crime 
scene… it does not matter, just arrest the maid and the building guards and beat them 
until they confess. Or just think about the nephew or the son: if they are taking drugs, 
they might want to steal and so on. (Telephone interview with a former officer, 
February 2015)  
In the investigations in Egypt, we extract truth through torture; the investigative 
officer has no other tool to investigate the truth. They are not trained on discussions, 
interrogation, and presenting suspects with some evidence, analyzing their 
confessions to detect any inconsistency. These skills are not taught to them. The only 
way is to beat the suspect until he confesses or confesses about any other suspect. 
And unfortunately, in so many cases, some suspects would confess a crime they have 
never done just to escape the torture. (Telephone interview with a former officer, 
February 2015)  
Torture was the main tool of investigations to solve criminal cases. The less we used 
it, fearing human rights NGOs, the fewer cases we solved. That is bad, but it is the 
truth. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.73)  
When we stopped the beatings, the rate of solved cases dramatically dropped 
(telephone interview with an officer, February 2015) 
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Therefore, the police's major problem is that the officers lack objective tools to 
solve cases other than violating suspects' basic rights. This negatively impacts their 
ability to work effectively and deeply harms their public image. On one hand, some 
citizens refuse to report crimes, since they are aware of the police's limited capacities 
in terms of investigations and suspects' arrests. On the other hand, some avoid 
reporting a potential suspect to the police over fears that it will result in human rights 
violations against the suspect. A third part of society avoids interacting with the police 
altogether, even for reporting a crime, since they fear being taken in as suspects for 
any unresolved crime. Therefore, there is a growing possibility for falsely-solved 
crimes based on forced confessions, which reflects a deep mistrust of police 
performance (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp.97-99 and p. 65).  
However, violence is not only used for functional reasons to solve cases or 
obtain a forced confession. In other words, police officers and sub-officers apply 
violence for a variety of reasons other than solving cases. Several incidents of torture 
have occurred in public places, not just in police stations or interrogation rooms, in 
order to enforce a certain level of deterrence for those who might consider breaking 
the law or contradicting police orders. As one officer explained:   
The best way to preserve security was during El-Adly's era, when everyone was 
afraid of interacting with the police. By that time, a general policy of deterrence was 
applied on the whole society, which is missing today, and so, it is hard to address 
security deficiencies since 2011. (Telephone interview with an officer, March 2015)  
Accordingly, most of the cases that are reported through checkpoints are illegally 
built, and thus they are not transferred to courts but will rather be disregarded by 
prosecutors. Nevertheless, these cases are of huge importance for the internal reports 
of the interior ministry, since they reflect what is commonly called "the effort." This 
concept reflects the performance rates of each directorate and department in the 
interior ministry, and thus the amount of activities undertaken by each director or 
department head. Because of this "effort", most of officers are required to increase 
their activity to meet or increase their previous records, in order to please their 
superiors, who in turn seek to please their respective superiors. Based on this effort, 
the interior ministry's effectiveness reports are built, regardless of the solidness of the 
reported cases and whether they are transferred to court or disregarded by prosecutors. 
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Therefore, the real interest of officers is directed to these fake performance reports 
and not to substantially preserving security (M. Abulezz, 2013. pp.81-87).  
Another aspect of work techniques is the security presence, which was initiated by 
El-Adly to ensure the political visibility of the interior ministry. According to this 
technique, police forces are divided into small groups around vital establishments in 
urban areas to ensure their security. Hence, these forces solely serve the security of 
these establishments and do not have any authority to address citizens who might seek 
their help. As one former officer explains:  
You are required to stand in front of these establishments for 12 hours a day doing 
nothing, but when any citizen seeks your help about any security incident on the 
street, you are not authorized to help him, except by calling the police emergency on 
the famous hotline 122. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.112) 
There was a general assumption that the large number of police officers and 
soldiers spread around every important establishment will automatically preserve 
security by deterring anyone from breaking the law. But in reality, these ineffective 
and distracting work techniques absorb the efforts of police personnel, without 
ensuring any improvements in security. Moreover, such a monotonous technique 
negatively impacts officers' willingness and enthusiasm to work (M. Abulezz, 2013, 
p.112). Therefore, most of the real police work regarding investigations, public order, 
and police patrols is actually carried out by the sub-officers. In terms of numbers, the 
police sub-officers are approximately eight to 10 times more than the police officers. 
Hence, assuming that police officers number around 40,000, sub-officers consist of 
around 320,000 to 400,000 (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015). As 
one officer explained, the sub-officers are in charge of most of the dirty work done by 
the interior ministry, whether during investigations, interrogations, or arrests. In some 
cases, officers are obliged to use work techniques adopted by sub-officers to solve a 
case, since they do not have other options, considering the poor work conditions and 
the pressure that they endure from their superiors. Thus, if a freshly graduated officer 
is keen to apply the right procedures that he learned at the academy, he will face 
resistance from his elder sub-officers, even if they work under his authority. He 
cannot replace them; indeed, he needs them, since they are more familiar than he is 
with the community (Email interview with a police officer, February 2015). 
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The Sub-officers receive legal and police instruction at the Institute of Police Sub-
Officers. Yet their most valuable asset is that they deeply infiltrate the community in 
which they are serving, thus managing a wide network of thugs to support the MOI's 
dirty work when necessary. The MOI outsources these networks to intimidate political 
opponents or keep it unofficially informed about criminal gangs in rural areas or 
slums. Yet these networks are not keen to enforce the law. Rather, they enforce their 
own authority, benefiting from their relation with the MOI. They also apply multiple 
illegal techniques in the process, such as bribes and extortion (T. Aclimandos, 2012, 
p.2-3). Moreover, some of these thugs use their authority to report their local enemies 
to the MOI, instead of those who are actually breaking the law, without any potential 
control over the credibility of the information they are providing (Moheyeldeen, 2014, 
p.6). These networks are used as information tools which help in building cases in 
their respective areas, with the relationship orchestrated by the sub-officers. (Personal 
interview with a human rights expert, February 2015)  
There is deep tension between the officers and sub-officers, in terms of work 
division and salary disparities. Sub-officers legally have the right to join the officers' 
ranks if they accomplish 25 years of service or acquire a law degree and then join the 
police academy to graduate as molazem awal. Nevertheless, El-Adly was reluctant to 
apply this condition in order to preserve the interior ministry's social selection over its 
police officers. But after the 2011 revolution, sub-officers conducted several protests 
and strikes to call for the promotion of qualified sub-officers to the rank of officer (B. 
Abdelaziz, 2013, p165). As one officer explained:   
Mahmoud Wagdy (interior minister right after the revolution, between January and 
March, 2011) decided to accept some of them as officers and there are almost 40,000 
waiting to be promoted. This way, the number of officers who were previously sub-
officers will exceed those who were originally officers. This will deeply alter their 
jobs, because they are from lower social backgrounds and adopt illegal work 
techniques and are highly corrupt, even partnering with criminal gangs in different 
areas.  (Email interview with a police officer, February, 2015) 
I agree that the sub-officer manages most of the dirty work of the police, but they are 
not responsible for all the violations. There are plenty of officers who violate the 
people's rights, too. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, March 
2015) 
Being from a lower social background is not generally a crime, but it can be a 
disqualifying criterion for the MOI against those who wish to join the police academy. 
As one human rights' researcher explains: 
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The rationale behind establishing the sub-officer rank in the late sixties was to spare 
the police officer who is generally the son of the middle or higher classes from 
working in poorer areas and lower social backgrounds. Hence, recruiting a sub-
officer from lower classes as an intermediary to support police work in marginalized 
areas was the major goal of the MOI at that time. This was an important idea to 
infiltrate these communities... so the sub-officer is the government in the eyes of 
poorer areas, but the officer is the representation of the government for the higher 
classes. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, February, 2015) 
The problem is that sub-officers might not solely be working for the police, since 
their low wages oblige them to work in other economic activities. Thus, they work 
with the police to illegally protect these activities, or financially benefit from their 
authority as policemen to receive bribes and practice extortion. As one former officer 
explains: 
It does not matter if their salaries are increased, because they are already corrupted. 
For instance, they tend to gain LE15,000 through corruption, so when the MOI 
increases their salaries for instance from LE800LE to LE3,000 per month, it does not 
stop their corrupt activities. They might only decrease them, but they continue to gain 
the same amount of illegally earned money. (Telephone interview with a former 
officer, February 2015) 
Nevertheless, corruption in police work is not only practiced in lower ranking 
levels, meaning it is not the sole responsibility of sub-officers. The MOI manages a 
variety of economic activities, the profit of which is not included in the official state 
budget. This explains the disparity between the official budget of the MOI of around 
LE23 billion and other estimation of the budget ranging around LE85 billion, as 
previously mentioned (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). As one officer explains: 
There are plenty of profitable companies - bakeries, restaurants offering food and 
drinks for the security forces and Central Security Forces. There are also the farms 
and galleries of the prison authorities, where the workers are prisoners or the interior 
ministry's conscripts (. . .) these activities gain millions of pounds, and this is all 
illegal because they do not appear in the interior ministry's budget, and the Central 
Agency for Auditing is not aware of [this money]… from these millions, the big 
colonels of the MOI receive huge salaries that could amount to LE1 million per 
month for each of them... this is a fact that everyone knows, but tell me, how can I 
work properly knowing this, while my salary is barely meeting the effort I am putting 
out by working on the streets every day? (Email Interview with a police officer, 
February, 2015 
Such monetary figures could be exaggerated, even if it coincides with another 
estimation by former high ranking officers who stated that almost LE4 billion  were 
allocated for annual loyalty payments for around 350 liwā' and 'amīd from El-Adly's 
close circle, which means that each of them received almost LE1 million per month 
(O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Nevertheless, these profitable economic activities could be 
legal, even if they do not appear in the official budget of the MOI. Yet, the problem is 
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that this "unofficial" budget is the reason for a long conflict with the Central Agency 
for Auditing (CAA) that started after the 2011 revolution. The MOI has constantly 
refused CAA auditors access to its financial documents, despite several mediations, 
especially by the current Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahleb. According to the CAA's 
head, Hisham Genena (2012 to present), the CAA was given access to the financial 
documents of the defense ministry but was denied the same with the interior ministry 
(El-Mogy 2014). Most of the interior ministry's hidden budget is managed through 
special funds which are legally put outside the State's budget. These funds include the 
officers' retirement payments, as well as the fines collected by the ministry itself. 
Some of the preliminary reports of the CAA concluded that the MOI runs many 
officers' solidarity funds, which receive monthly contributions from every officer who 
wishes to receive a large sum in return upon his retirement. However, the investment 
of these funds is not audited by the CAA and could amount to several billion Egyptian 
pounds (Alzanaty & Abufaddan 2014). Each police department has its respective 
solidarity funds, but the amount received by each officer upon his retirement varies 
according to the years of subscription and the report of his superiors prior to his 
retirement. Therefore, these funds are used to keep most of the officers loyal to the 
status quo within the interior ministry; otherwise, their retirement payments will be 
negatively impacted. Hence, this study does not claim to generate new findings 
regarding the budget figures of the MOI, it rather relies on several estimations to 
highlight that the current management of these funds deepens the sense of inequality 
among the interviewed officers.   
Accordingly, the promotion criteria within the MOI help to preserve the status 
quo. After graduation, an officer gets his first rank as molazīm awwál for three years, 
then naqib for seven years, and then he continues to escalate the ranking hierarchy 
according to his year of graduation and number of years in service. Nevertheless, 
starting from 'amīd, promotions depend greatly on the reports of an officer's superiors, 
who decide who is promoted to liwā' and who is brought to retirement (email 
interview with an officer, March 2015). Therefore, whoever tries to expose corruption 
or apply changes that conflict with the interior ministry's policy, is generally sent to 
retirement with the rank of 'amīd, with a lower retirement payment than his 
colleagues.  As a former officer elaborates:  
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Any officer who tries to stop this corruption will be punished having his retirement 
payment decreased. They work as a network to isolate and punish any clean-handed 
officer who wants to report about them… Thus, we thought that we should create a 
coalition for the good officers in order to coordinate and protect ourselves in the 
same way as the corrupted officers… This was the main idea behind forming a 
coalition for police officers to demand their rights for a suitable salary and humane 
work conditions. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015) 
Hence, several officers, right after the 2011 revolution, decided to form a general 
coalition for police officers in order to expose corruption within the top ranks and 
support the civilian effort to cleanse the interior ministry. The idea was welcomed by 
thousands of officers who enrolled in the coalition, and the body began to voice 
officers' demands for improvements in salaries and work conditions. In March 2012, 
the coalition was transformed into a general syndicate which negotiated with the MOI 
for new raises in officers' salaries, which amounted to increases of 300% (Al-
Shorouk, 21-6-2012), and limited the working hours of officers from around 14 to 
eight 8 hours per day. As one officer explains: 
We used to work between 14 and 16 hours a day, but after the revolution the MOI 
positively responded to officers' demands and lowered the working hours to only 
eight or nine hours… Before, I used to work from 8am to 4pm, then have a break and 
start working again from 7pm to 12am, or maybe more. Now I am not required to 
return to work in a night shift. But in reality, there is no one to replace me, and the 
work is not done properly without my presence. (Telephone interview with a police 
officer, February 2015) 
Despite the visible attempt of the MOI to appease the demands of a wide range of 
officers, it firmly punished all active officers who insisted on creating an independent 
syndicate with an elected leadership. Hence, around 32 officers from the active group 
who helped create the general syndicate were subject to administrative investigations 
within the interior ministry (Al-youm al-sabae', 21-3-2012). Finally, the ministry 
managed to reach an agreement with the general syndicate group to disregard their 
punishments in return for abstaining from contacting the media. Afterwards, the 
purpose of the syndicate shifted to organizing free elections for the administrative 
boards of the officers' clubs, following the model of the judges' clubs (telephone 
interview with a former officer, March 2015). Accordingly, the first election was 
conducted in April 2013, via electronic votes, with a turnout of around 40% among 
officers on duty (Al-Watan 28-4-2013)
4
. Following this, officers' demands for reforms 
                                                           
4
  13,953 out of a total of 34,787 officers on duty, and 2,187 out of 9,776 retired officers, voted 
in these elections, with a turnout rate of 40 % for officers on duty and 22.5% for retired officers. For 
further information, see: Al-Watan newspaper, 28-4-2013  
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were generally met, which in return decreased the importance and the popularity of an 
independent syndicate among police officers.   
 
E- Accountability  
The accountability of the police is the major criterion that differentiates a democratic 
force from others. Therefore, as accountability mechanisms become more diverse and 
are exercised by different actors, the police apparatus will better correspond to 
democratic norms and values. In theory, police work can be controlled and overseen 
by multiple actors, whether civilian overseers or those from a police background. In 
all cases, the multiplicity of overseers does not hinder accountability but rather serves 
as a multi-layered system of checks and balances to guarantee a perfect 
implementation of police work. Thus, the police should have an internal authority to 
supervise officers' performance and investigate any complaint filed against its 
personnel. The judiciary has great authority in determining the legality of work 
techniques applied by the police, and this authority is utilized, whether by the final 
courts or preliminary prosecutors.      
In the Egyptian case, the MOI has a special department for internal control, called 
altaftīsh, which reviews officers' performance and investigates complaints filed 
against them. As a result, the altaftīsh has the authority to conduct an administrative 
investigation with an officer and decide on a suitable punishment. Generally, the 
punishments can range from a verbal warning to registered mistakes in the officer's 
administrative file, which could impact his career path and determine the placement 
of his future service. Most of the officers interviewed for this study perceived the 
internal control department as very firm in investigating an officers' misconduct. 
However, there was wide divergence about whether the altaftīsh applies the same fair 
rules across all the cases it investigates. The internal control inspectors generally 
conduct random field inspections on police forces in different areas to check on their 
readiness, yet the exact criteria upon which they build their judgments are unclear. In 
fact, the interviewed officers were critical about inspectors' superficial remarks 
concerning their appearance and not their actual readiness and fitness. As a former 
officer explains: 
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All they care about is being in shape… clean shaven ... putting the whole uniform on, 
with shining shoes…if I was trained lately on shooting or not… how many bullets I 
have in my pockets and if I fired any of them lately (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.107-108) 
This might appear superficial, but it is serious. Imagine the stress the officer will be 
in when he is wearing his white uniform and dealing with people involved in violent 
disputes, and is all covered in blood, and in the middle of all that he must keep his 
white uniform clean, or otherwise he might be punished by the internal control 
authority. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015) 
Moreover, the internal inspection could investigate certain cases upon the request 
of officers, especially chief officers. As one officer emphasizes:  
My boss reported on me because I fired several bullets in the air to foil an escape 
attempt led by the prisoners' relatives on our police station... nobody was killed, 
nobody was injured… but I solved the problem and saved the lives of  my colleagues 
with these few bullets… My boss reported on me because he did not want to share 
the responsibility of wasting these bullets… you know, the bullets are 'ohda  (legally 
guarded)… He testified against me, but the inspector did not listen to me and directly 
believed him… My career path was negatively impacted by this incident. I was 
arbitrarily transferred and I have served in bad places since then. (Telephone 
interview with an officer, March 2015)  
Another officer explained:  
They will never admit that a naqīb is saying the truth and that an 'aqīd is lying. They 
will directly believe the higher ranking [officer]… who can protect me if I want to 
report about my boss's deviation? Nobody (Telephone interview with an officer, 
February 2015) 
However, some officers feel that the punishment procedures taken by inspectors 
can easily be omitted if the officer in question has a strong connection in the 
leadership of the interior ministry. As one former officer described his experience 
with the inspection:  
It was used against me, to punish me for trying to report on some corrupt colleagues, 
not to really investigate the matter of corruption. (Telephone interview with a former 
officer, March 2015) 
Another officer elaborated on this point: 
Nepotism is really common in this case… Let me tell you, if I commit a mistake 
jointly with another officer, and he has a strong connection, I might be strictly 
punished and he will probably survive without even an investigation... The case will 
be omitted from his file and inserted in mine… It's as simple as that. (Telephone 
interview with an officer, March 2015)  
Generally, the internal control investigates matters of discipline, conduct, 
performance, and eventually, police brutality. However, it seems that the matter of 
discipline and following superiors' orders is more important to the inspection than 
other matters of brutality. Therefore, taken into consideration the limitation of the 
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sample, there is a general perception that the MOI tolerates the systematic brutality 
that leads to cases being solved, and some functional brutality to intimidate political 
opponents, especially that carried out by the SSI/NSA. Therefore, there are multiple 
cases of torture and extra-legal killings conducted by SSI officers during 
interrogations that have passed without a minor investigation (O. Ashour, 2012, p.7). 
Nevertheless, other incidents show that the MOI did not tolerate random brutality 
from off-duty officers for personal reasons; hence, these officers were accused of 
intended murder and transferred to courts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p83). A former officer 
considered the case of Khaled Said as an exception of the standard policy in this 
regard, explaining: 
Khalid Said's case wasn't a political case to insist on protecting the sub-officers 
accused of his murder, because El-Adly was only keen to protect the SSI officers. 
But those working in criminal security did not receive the same attention and 
protection. He could have sacrificed one or two officers for justice to appease the 
public opinion, but he didn't… that is why the situation escalated to wide protests. 
(M. Abulezz, 2014. P.123)  
The judiciary system serves as an oversight mechanism that scrutinizes police 
work on several levels. In the 1980s, when the police applied systematic torture to 
solve terrorism cases, the courts granted more than 190 acquittals after determining 
that the suspects' confessions had been violently extracted. Accordingly, around 41 
officers were transferred to the criminal courts for applying torture during 
interrogations for these cases (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.64). Yet this a posteriori 
oversight mechanism did not seem to stop police brutality in interrogations, 
considering that it still persists as a systematic tool for building cases. The cases of 
Khaled Said in June 2010 and Sayed Belal in December 2010, both occurring, in 
Alexandria, reflected the continuance of deadly police brutality. Both cases were 
reinvestigated after the revolution, under pressure from the revolutionary coalitions, 
and resulted in 10-year sentences for the two sub-officers involved in the killing of 
Khaled Said, a 15-year sentence for a SSI officer, and acquittals for four other officers 
who were previously accused in the killing of Sayed Belal (Marssadpress16-4-2013).       
On the other hand, almost all of the public officials during the 2011 revolution, 
including high ranking officials from the interior ministry, were granted acquittals. 
Thus, the judiciary has distinguished between killings that occurred during the 
revolution and those that occurred in police custody. In fact, the acquittal verdicts for 
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those charged with killing protesters during the revolution were built upon the concept 
of the prevalence of mass killings, in a way that impedes collecting strong evidence or 
specifying responsibility. This totally ignores the extraction of several "official 
bullets" from the bodies of those who were killed across Cairo and Giza during the 
revolution (Hesham 2015).  Yet the verdicts were guided by a different logic, which 
was the concept of self-defense applied by officers to protect their police stations 
from being invaded or burned following mass protests. As one officer explained: 
The officers were only arrested to appease public opinion, but what they did to 
defend their police stations was 100% legal, as the law gives them the right to fire on 
whoever tries to break into a police station. (Telephone interview with a police 
officer, February 2015)  
A former officer further clarified the matter:   
If I was serving in a police station at that time, I would think of protecting my station, 
the weapons and the legal registries in there, as well as the lives of the soldiers 
serving under my authority. Then I would leave to protect my own family. This 
would be my priority, so I cannot blame these officers, yet I cannot blame the 
protestors either. It was a complicated situation (…) the judges could not actually 
specify responsibility in these murders (…) it was insane to transfer these murders to 
ordinary criminal justice procedures… They should have been dealt with delicately. 
(M. Abulezz, 2014, pp. 126-127) 
On the other hand, the only one of these incidents to be investigated was the case 
of 37 prisoners who were killed in a police truck at Abo-Za'bel prison right after the 
Rabi'a dispersal in August 2013. The prisoners were kept in the vehicle under the sun 
for 12 hours with no food or drink, and when they asked to be released they were hit 
with tear gas, resulting in the deaths of 37 out of 45 prisoners. Four officers were 
accused of applying violence that resulted in unintentional murder. One officer was 
sentenced to 10 years in jail, while the three others received one year. But later on, the 
officers' appeal was accepted and the case was transferred to the public prosecution 
for new investigations (Al-tahrir 22-1-2015).  
As part of the justice system, prosecutors play an important role in reviewing the 
police’s role, examining the legal procedures applied by the police and deciding if a 
case should be transferred to the courts. Hence, when a prosecutor decides to 
disregard a case, it means that he holds the police incompetent in building strong 
cases to be transferred to the courts. But it is quite controversial to use this issue as a 
measurement for the police performance or for the degree of the prosecutors' 
oversight over the police work. Prosecutors can confirm cases that are not strongly 
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built but that will be acquitted in future court verdicts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p. 121). 
As one officer explained: 
When the prosecutor disregards a case, that means that the procedures applied were 
wrong which is very common because no one in the police applies the right legal 
procedures in building cases. In the police report, they usually describe a completely 
invented story about the search and the arrest… but it could also reflect that the 
whole case was not worth reporting. (Personal interview with a police officer, 
February 2015) 
This was underlined by a former officer in a different way: 
I was constantly called by the prosecutors to sign the disregarded cases that I reported 
at the checkpoint where I served… I knew that the cases were nothing, but I was 
obliged to report them to increase my reporting rates at the interior ministry… But I 
was truly relieved to learn that the prosecutors had disregarded the cases because 
they were nonsense. (M. Abulezz, 2014, p. 83 & 86) 
Similarly, another officer discusses the authority granted to prosecutors:  
We have no other choice than using violence against suspects to solve cases, but we 
should apply physical violence that does not leave any trace or evidence to be 
identified by the prosecutors, otherwise the case will be blown and disregarded. 
(Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015) 
Another officer explained: 
Judicial oversight is not just a theory; it is actually present and activated. There is no 
way that an officer who shot a suspect, causing his death, will not be tried. He is 
immediately transferred to the general prosecution and will be held in jail for four 
days and with his detention then renewed. Judicial oversight is activated and the 
general prosecutors maintain a really formal relationship with the officers when they 
commit a mistake that mandates a trial, there is no exception in that, I am telling you.  
(Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015) 
Nevertheless, the oversight applied by prosecutors is neither absolute nor holistic. 
In theory, prosecutors have the legal authority to inspect a police station, its detaining 
cells, prisons, interrogation rooms, and to protect detainees from any potential torture. 
Yet they might not be keen to hold police officers accountable for these offences, due 
to reasons that include sympathies with the officers’ personal networks, since a large 
portion of prosecutors were former police officers (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p9). As one 
officer explains: 
They have the legal authority to check on everything, but do they do it? Or can they 
practically do it? This will depend on so many things, if they want to control 
everything they can, and if they want to let go, they will, and nobody can question 
their decision. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015) 
The same logic was elaborated upon by another officer:  
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The prosecutor can, in theory, oversee all police work in terms of procedures and 
detention cells and everything, but if he does so and strictly controls everything, the 
police officers will not send a car or guarding soldiers to accompany the prosecutor at 
every crime scene investigation… the whole benefit-exchange formula between the 
officer and the prosecutor will explode. (Personal interview with an officer, February 
2015) 
On the other hand, there are some legal limitations to prosecutors' oversight of 
police work. The law specifies that the party who filed the complaint must provide the 
related supporting evidence; hence, in cases of police brutality in custody, the 
detainee who faced torture is requested to provide evidence supporting his complaint. 
As a former officer clarified: 
According to the law, if you said I was subject to torture, you have to prove it, but the 
whole situation is under the authority of the police and occurred in police custody, so 
it is always possible for the police to ruin evidence and upset the case. (Telephone 
interview with a former officer, February 2015)      
The prosecutors' authority to oversee the police is quite contestable and depends 
on the situation of each incident. In some cases, there is political support for the 
general prosecutor to investigate police brutality, like for instance the case of 
Shaymaa Al-Sabagh, a peaceful protestor who was shot dead in January 2015. The 
prosecutors thoroughly investigated the matter and even punished a senior police 
officer for misleading the investigation, then identified the police officer who was 
involved in shooting Al-Sabagh with a cartridge rifle (Al-Shourouk 17-3-2015). In 
this regard, the media played an important role in presenting clear evidence that 
proved the officer's responsibility, which forced the public prosecutor to act on the 
matter. However, other incidents which were not fully covered by the media received 
other treatment. In other cases such as the dispersal of Rabi'a and Nahda sit-ins, 
which resulted in the mass killings of a large number of protestors
5
, none of the police 
officers who served on that day were prosecuted for murder. The National Council of 
Human Rights official report on the sit-ins’ dispersals criticized the interior ministry's 
                                                           
5
  The National Council for Human Rights reported 632 cases of killings, including eight 
policemen in the sit-in dispersals and around 686 cases of killings, including 64 policemen in different 
clashes in several governorates following the dispersals. However, Human Rights Watch reported 817 
cases of killings by the security forces in the sit-in dispersals, added to 246 others killed in different 
clashes in other governorates. Full reports are available at: 
http://elbadil.com/2014/03/06/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-and at: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814ar_ForUpload_0.pdf - retrieved on 18-12-2014 
 
   
83 
 
disproportionate use of force and recommended judicial investigation in this regard, 
yet none of these cases were examined by the public prosecutor. Hence, the decision 
to prosecute a police officer is quite controversial and depends on the political 
environment of each incident, rather than equally applying general rules to all cases. 
Parliamentarian oversight on police work is widely impacted by political balance 
of power. The interior minister usually presents an annual report to parliament in a 
public session (when it is functioning), yet this does not mean that the parliament has 
any substantial authority over the MOI (Bakr & Said, 2011, p.9). On the contrary, 
during Mubarak's rule, this annual report was an occasion to show the interior 
minister’s power over the parliament. For instance, Zaki Badr, interior minister in 
1990s, slapped a parliament member in the middle of a hearing session for protesting 
the content of Badr's speech
6
. Later, between 2005 and 2010, most of the opposition 
parliamentarians presented multiple interrogations to the interior minister about 
torture at police stations. However, parliamentary bureaucracy manipulated the 
situation to avoid any serious employment of parliamentarian tools against the interior 
minister (Ne'matallah 2009). After the revolution, the minister addressed the 
parliament in February 2012, denying the use of firearms to control the popular 
protests following the Portsaid massacre
7
. But a parliamentary committee investigated 
the clashes near the MOI's headquarters in Cairo and collected evidence of the use of 
firearms and cartridges to forcibly disperse the protesters. Accordingly, a 
parliamentary committee investigating the Portsaid massacre highlighted the MOI's 
failure to secure the football match and confiscate weapons carried into the stadium 
by some of the fans (Al-masry al-youm 12-2-2012). Such oversight mechanisms had a 
limited role in orienting the police work, even though the minister was keen to 
emphasize the MOI's improved performance in respecting people's rights. Thus far, 
with the exception of inquiries and hearing sessions, parliamentarian oversight has 
never reached the stage of politically punishing a minister as a result of the police 
                                                           
6
   A video of this incident is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOwwiF4vzBQ – 
retrieved on 20-3-2015  
7  In a football match held in Portsaid, 73 of Al-Ahly club supporters were killed when trying to 
exit the football stadium with visible police failure in protecting the masses, in an incident that was 
perceived as a police conspiracy against Al-Ahly club supporters who were in the frontline of the 
January 25
th
 revolution.    
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deviation. Generally, parliamentarian oversight has a limit in inspecting police work, 
as one officer explained: 
Parliament members are not competent to oversee our work, you know why? They 
used to come to inspect the prisons and detention cells, especially the committee of 
defense and national security. But everyone in this committee has a relative that he 
wants to join the police academy or needs to be employed at a certain place but is 
waiting for a security approval. Tell me how they will be fair monitors in this regard. 
They will never try to escalate the situation if they find something wrong. This is not 
about us, it is the problem of the community as a whole. Why do you elect these 
people in the first place, when all they care about are their own interests? (Telephone 
interview with an officer, February 2015)    
This view could partly explain the parliament’s limited authority regarding the 
MOI's misconduct. Yet, the MOI has a direct interest in keeping the bargaining with 
the politicians possible in order to escape any democratic control over its 
performance. Additionally, political balances in parliament have never resulted in a 
strong majority that is determinant to impact the ministry’s security policy. In the 
2012 Parliament, the comity of the Defense and the National Security was active in 
discussing the police reform initiatives, yet, it finally passed a bill that focused only 
on raising the salaries and exempting the police personnel from military trials 
(Personal interview with a human rights expert, February 2015). Hence, several 
opportunities have been wasted to build political consensus in order to enforce 
civilian control over police work.  
Concerning the interior ministry's budget, it was never thoroughly discussed in 
parliament, since the ministry's budget is presented as a total amount without details 
of expenditure. Parliament has passed constant raises in the MOI's share of the state 
budget since 2005 (Abdel-Rady 2011)
8
, yet between 2012 and 2013, just one year, the 
MOI's budget jumped from LE18 billion to LE23.5 billion. Similarly, the 2013/2014 
budget consisted of a LE10 billion raise in the MOI's share of the state budget (Al-
masry al-youm 13-5-2013). The main argument for these raises was to provide the 
ministry with suitable resources to build its capacities and regain control over the 
country’s deteriorating security conditions. Yet there was no reform regarding the 
arrangements of the budget, and it wasn’t discussed, with the exception of some 
parliamentarian complaints concerning its ambiguity (Gharib 2013). Moreover, the 
lower house of parliament did not get the chance to ratify the 2012/2013 state budget 
                                                           
8
   Many estimations considered the interior ministry's yearly budget to be between LE3-4 
billion, but between 2002 and 2005, the budget was raised to LE12 billion.  
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introduced under the authority of the SCAF, because it was dissolved before 
concluding the budget discussions. But the shoura council, the upper house of 
parliament, discussed the 2013/2014 budget and ratified it with no substantial 
amendments to the MOI's portion, just days before the June 30, 2013 mass protests.  
From the governmental side, the oversight mechanism on the police is 
primarily practiced by the president, who usually tends to replace the interior minister 
after outstanding failures. For instance, Ahmed Roushdy (1984-1986) in the eighties 
was replaced by Zaki Bard (1986-1990) after the famous protest incidents conducted 
by soldiers from the Central Security Forces (CSF)
9
, which urged the military to 
intervene and repress the strike. Yet other analysis considers that Roushdy was 
dismissed for conducting serious corruption investigations that involved several 
ministers and government officials (Arafat 2013). Similarly, Hassan Al-Alfy was 
replaced by Habib El-Adly in 1997 after a terrorist attack on tourist attractions in 
Luxor that killed around 60 persons mostly tourists (the Economist 20-11-1997). 
Also, following the 2011 revolution, El-Adly was replaced by Mahmoud Wagdy, who 
stayed in office two months before being replaced by Mansour El-Essawy. Moreover, 
El-Essawy himself stayed in office for seven months only and was replaced in 
December 2011 by Mohamed Ibrahim Youssef. The latter stayed in office for nine 
months, until he was replaced by Ahmed Gamal El-Din in August 2012. Hence, every 
appointment of a new interior minister was received by the country’s political powers 
as a chance for reform as well as a form of political punishment to the previous 
minister. This was especially the case of Gamal El-Din, who was dismissed in 
January 2013 after refusing to forcibly suppress anti-Morsi protests near the Ittihādiya 
presidential palace a month earlier. Therefore, Mohamed Ibrahim, who came to office 
following Gamal El-Din, was perceived as the minister of Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, this turned out to be false, since Ibrahim was involved with 
the military in ousting Morsi on July 3, 2013, and violently dispersing his supporters' 
sit-ins in August 2013. Later, in March 2015, Ibrahim was replaced by Magdy Abdel-
Ghaffar after consecutive security failures, among them terrorist attacks in Sinai and 
an enormous fire that ruined the Cairo International Conference Center in the east 
district of Nasr City (Thabet 2015).  
                                                           
9
  In 1986, thousands of military conscripts within the central security forces staged a wide riot 
to protest a rumor of a potential extension of their military duty for one more year  
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However, the most effective type of accountability in Egypt was actually 
practiced by the human rights NGOs and the media. The most tangible reform 
initiative was presented by a group of civil society organizations, law professors and 
police officers that was called the National Initiative for Police Reform NIPR. The 
NIPR emphasized the different angles of the police reform especially the police 
accountability. As one security studies' researcher involved in drafting the NIPR 
formula explained:  
In our first draft we emphasized the most radical suggestions for reform, and then we 
lightened it gradually in October 2011, then in 2012 and in 2013. Thus the first 
version was really sharp in requesting the prosecution of the officers involved in the 
killings during the revolution and this was particularly the demand of the officers 
involved with us who perceived an active accountability as a mechanism to purify the 
police from the bad elements, because they did not want to share responsibility in 
those killings (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015) 
Another activist in the NIPR explained: 
Our essential emphasize was on the accountability and on the settlement of the 
previous crimes committed by the MOI, which are committed until today, and will 
continue until the reform actually begins. The society is full of victims of the MOI's 
crimes who were not compensated by any means. So if we wanted to build a stable 
and productive society served by a legitimate police force, the police violations 
should be accountable for (Personal interview with a human rights' activist, March 
2015)   
Most of the cases of brutality which were investigated by prosecutors and 
transferred to courts were primarily supported with wide media coverage and accurate 
documentation by human rights NGOs. The Khaled Said case in 2010 was an example 
of this right before the January 25
th
 revolution, followed by the Shaymaa Al-Sabagh 
case in 2015 after the July 3
rd
 2013. A prominent NGO that has been involved in 
holding the police accountable is the Al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of 
Violence Victims, which has played a prominent role in documenting the majority of 
police brutality incidents, whether those occurring in police custody or other places. 
The center also notably published a report after the first 100 days of Morsi's 
presidency to expose continuing violations. Afterwards, the center reported 359 cases 
of torture and 217 cases of killings by the police or in clashes that the police failed to 
control during Morsi's rule (Al-Nadeem Center, 2013). Similarly, the center published 
a well-documented report about incidents of torture and death committed by the 
police after the June 30 revolution under the rules of interim president Adly Mansour 
and elected President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi (Al-Nadeem Center 2014). These detailed 
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reports were based on the personal testimonials of hundreds who survived the 
violence and torture, as well as sources from both traditional and new media. 
Moreover, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published a similar and more 
elaborate report to document the killings that occurred in the summer of 2013, 
following the Rabi'a and Nahda dispersals (EIPR 2014). Although these reports 
documenting extrajudicial killings were important in raising awareness about the rate 
of the violations, they didn’t put enough pressure on enforcing the prosecution of the 
incidents’ perpetrators. However, the case of lawyer Karim Hamdy, who died from 
torture in a police station in February 2015, proved that the wide protests conducted 
by the Lawyers' Syndicate played a prominent role in forcing the prosecution of two 
NSA officers who were involved in his death (Al-Watan 1-3-2015). Hence, civil 
institutions endorsing specific cases of violence will likely play an effective role in 
police accountability, compared to other cases which were not endorsed. Moreover, 
the more visible the case is in the media and the wider the alliance is that requests its 
investigation, the greater the probability that its perpetrators' will be prosecuted. Yet, 
not all cases of violation are equally endorsed, and so not all cases are properly 
investigated.  
Accordingly, when Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper published in April 2015 a 
well documented report about the police violations, the MOI threatened to prosecute 
the newspaper for publishing false incidents. The MOI has been always unwelcoming 
any type of criticism regarding its performance, claiming any abuse incident 
conducted by the police to be exceptional and unrepresentative of the general conduct 
of the MOI. However, the MOI is deliberately intimidating the media outlets which 
persist on exposing the wrongdoing of its personnel, since the wide media coverage of 
the police abuses will enforce the investigation of violence incidents and the 
prosecution of the perpetrators. 
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VII- Recommendations for Police Reform in Egypt 
 
 In this part the different views regarding the police reform are discussed and 
contrasted in order to highlight the reform formula that could be applicable in Egypt. 
The reform views are based on the insights of the interviewed police officers and 
human rights' experts, yet articulated around the four criteria of the democratic 
policing as discussed earlier in the analytical framework.  
A. Political Neutrality  
Despite the importance of the political neutrality of the police, the police reform itself 
requires a political will favorable of the reform. Hence, the main question in this 
regard was how to trigger the political will to introduce the police reform. Some of the 
interviewees considered that convincing the current authority to stop using the police 
as a political tool to suppress its opponents would be hard since a politicized police is 
definitely consolidating its power. In this regard, the trigger for the reform could be a 
second wave of police collapse which is similar to what happened on January 28
th 
2011. Such a collapse would oblige the current rulers to allow a political opening 
leading to a general initiative of institutional reform including the police reform. As a 
sociologist explained: 
In some times, when the authority's structure reaches a certain level of depth and 
complexity, a certain level of violence is needed to penetrate this depth and dismantle 
its structure. The MOI is like a wildlife predator, it should be first beaten, then well 
fed and nurtured before you can expect anything from it (Personal Interview with a 
sociologist, March 2015) 
 In contrast, others considered that a complete collapse is not required, because the 
MOI is already aware of its deficiencies since the first collapse on January 28
th
, 2011. 
Therefore, this view perceives the adoption of the reform as applicable if approached 
from the professionalism angle which gives priority to improving the officers' 
salaries, work conditions and training. As explained by a human rights journalist:  
The police was already engaged in June 30 as a partner with other political trends 
against the MB, thus we can build on this partnership to introduce a wider scale of 
reform based primarily on improving their work conditions, then come other aspects 
of reform such as the accountability and the de-militarization and so on… And this 
could easily happen without a need for a second beat, like the way it was in January 
28
th
, we might not survive another beat for the police, the situation is already 
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precarious and fragile. We cannot actually control the scale of a second beat, so we 
cannot get its benefits, if any. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015) 
 Opposed to this view, another view considered that the reform should be tackled 
in a holistic approach where all angles of reform are introduced in parallel. As 
explained by a political science scholar: 
The people will never accept to postpone the police accountability, even if there is no 
parliament for a while, the people will refuse that with lots of other mechanisms. The 
police accountability is crucial because with every victim killed, the political regime 
will gain more enemies and its stability will be at the stack, hence, the regime's 
legitimacy will be deeply harmed by the absence of the accountability (Personal 
interview with a political scientist, March 2015) 
In addition to that, a human rights activist explained: 
The reform demands are really interdependent and interrelated. If there is no 
monitoring mechanism for every measure of reform we propose, it will not be 
implemented in a proper way, as if it was not applied at all. Therefore, without 
multiple mechanisms of accountability, the reform has no core (Personal interview 
with a human rights activist, March 2015)  
   Considering the same logic, the likelihood of the reform is tightly linked to the 
regime's ability to control the political situation through the current police status. 
Hence, the consecutive security crises will enforce the regime to adopt some 
substantial reforms; otherwise it will face a second collapse.  Thus a sociologist put it 
in an "either/or" equation as follows: 
Either the State allows certain spaces and discourses of reform that would eventually 
help it later to evolve, or it considers that as an attempt to destroy its structures and 
then ignore the reform until it is actually facing collapse by the constant failure and 
deficiencies in its institutions especially the police. (Personal interview with a 
sociologist, March 2015) 
Regardless of the trigger for the introduction of the reform, a holistic approach 
should be adopted when tackling the different angles of the reform. Thus, the 
hypothesis of introducing some professional reforms before consolidating the 
accountability mechanisms was widely refuted by most of the interviewees. Even, the 
police officers requested a clear set of oversight mechanisms in order to properly fight 
terrorism, to counter corruption within the apparatus and to widen the legitimacy of 
the police action (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015). As one 
political science scholar put it:  
The democracy consolidation is based on a bunch of sustainable reforms, amongst is 
the police reform. The police reform is a substantial part of the implementation of the 
social contract with the people …We have to consider all the aspects of reform 
simultaneously, because they are interdependent, you cannot hold them accountable 
if you do not give them effective tools of professional investigation ... we need to 
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solve the dilemma of security and human rights. (Personal interview with a political 
science scholar, March 2015) 
As another political scientist added:  
We cannot set effective oversight mechanism without consolidating an independent 
judiciary and a strong parliament, the whole process of reform is interdependent, and 
the police reform is not an isolated exception (Personal interview with a political 
science scholar, February 2015) 
Additionally, a police officer expressed the same view: 
The security is better served if all of the State's institutions undergo a comprehensive 
reform to overcome the deficiencies of the bureaucracy, because the work of the MOI 
depends on many other institutions not only the police. (Email Interview with an 
officer, March 2015) 
 Moreover, a human rights researcher emphasized the importance of tackling the 
reform as a win/win situation for both sides; the police and the people. He elaborated 
as follows: 
The reform discourse should be approached as a win/win game not a zero sum game 
between the MOI and the civil society, both sides should come out of it with 
respective gains it is not a matter of revenge (Personal interview with a human rights' 
researcher, March 2015) 
 Despite the importance of the holistic approach in tackling the police reform, some 
interviewees stressed on gradual incremental steps to introduce the reform. As one 
officer stated:  
It should definitely be gradual, slow, and led by strong insider figures because most 
probably the apparatus will not accept a reform plan from an outsider. There are 
some institutions who will never accept an imposed reform from outside its 
members, such as the judiciary and the police. Thus it should be introduced gradually 
through some compromises, for instance, the salaries will be raised in exchange of 
passing some reforms and additional tasks for the police and so on. If the reform is 
pushed forward through radical immediate changes, the apparatus will resist and as a 
result could stop functioning. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015) 
On the contrary, other interviewees highlighted that the police is like any other 
public institution, the personnel of which will directly follow the instructions of their 
superiors. As a former police officer explained: 
If the reform is adopted by a strong, competent and determinant minister, he would 
probably change the whole ministry in one year (. . .) that is how the police doctrine 
works, no matter who is in charge, the people in the organization will follow the new 
rules with no thinking. It is actually a negative point, but when it comes to reform, it 
turns to be positive because everyone will follow. A strong minister with a clear 
vision and nontraditional methods would actually succeed in reforming the ministry 
with no potential resistance (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 
2015) 
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 Yet another former officer refuting the possibility of adopting an accelerated plan 
of reform has explained:  
If an accelerated plan is imposed, the ordinary citizen would pay a high price. Yet to 
implement a real reform, we have to design two plans, one for the short term and the 
other for the long term. The short term means 6 months and the long term means 
from 3 to 10 years, it does not matter, but we need a complete plan in hand before 
starting to reform (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015) 
 On the other hand, a third former officer suggested specific steps to properly lunch 
an effective reform process as follows:  
First step should be a wide purge for all corrupted leaders in the MOI, then the 
second step is to promote the mid-ranking officers to manage the reform, then the 
third step is changing the curricula of the police academy. Those who might resist the 
reform are dismissed, those who might embrace it are promoted and those who would 
implement it are well educated and trained on new effective methods (Telephone 
interview with a former officer, March 2015) 
 Yet a researcher in security studies articulated it differently by stating the 
following: 
The first step should be forming an assessment comity to investigate all of the MOI's 
sectors then suggest a reform plan scheduled on both short and long term (. . .) there 
is no unique formula of reform, each country has its own characteristics determining 
the likelihood and conditions of reform, so we have to study our conditions and 
suggest the needed reform accordingly (Personal interview with a security studies 
researcher, March 2015) 
 Therefore, the preferable context of the police reform in Egypt would be a 
political opening, whether based on a voluntary intention of reform from the regime 
or urged by the severe collapse of the apparatus. Generally, a successful reform plan 
should be based on the work of an assessment comity with diverse backgrounds with 
the purpose of scanning all the capacities and deficiencies of the MOI to suggest 
where to begin a short term reform and where to schedule a long term reform. In all 
cases, a multiplicity of actors should be involved in suggesting and monitoring the 
potential reforms, yet the importance of a civilian minister was contestable. Some of 
the interviewees insisted on a civilian minister to undertake the reforms as a guarantee 
that the reforms are implemented in the interest of the people. Whereas, an important 
portion of the interviewees preferred an insider in order to avoid any potential 
resistance. Thereby, the substance of the reform plan is the most important in this 
regard, rather than the background of the minister who would initiate the reform. 
However, the content of the reform should definitely be the result of a joint work of a 
diversity of actors and experts from the different fields related to the police work.  
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 On the other hand, almost all of the interviewees emphasized the importance of 
stopping the police interference in politics. The police officers and the human 
rightists' views coincided in considering the political burden on the police as an 
impediment to invest its capacities in the real police work. As one officer stated 
referring to the deadly Sinai bombings in January 2015: 
We were so occupied with following every detail in the life of the political 
opponents, to the extent of not being aware that a complete brigade will be targeted 
by several bombings in Sinai (Personal Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
  Additionally, two other officers referred to June 30, 2013 as an ideal moment 
when the police forces were actually protecting the protestors rather than attacking 
them. As one of them clarified:    
I believe the police should be involved when there is a protest or a rally, but to 
protect it, to make sure it will not turn into violence, to make sure it does not block 
the traffic not to forcibly disperse it… We should have like a special agency to 
analyze the reasons of each protest and try to address these reasons with peaceful 
methods rather than violent dispersal that causes death (Telephone Interview with an 
officer, February 2015)  
B. Demilitarization  
Demilitarizing the police was a controversial point when discussing the needed 
reform in Egypt. Some of the interviewees put it as a high priority if we aim at 
changing the police philosophy and make it more responsive to the people's needs, 
while other considered it a difficult step given the current war on terror. As a political 
science scholar explained:   
The militarization cannot be easily decreased in the context of the war on terror, but 
they can use more accurate weapons and work on their training to be more specific, 
in order to decrease the side effects of this pattern of a militarized police. For anti-
riots forces, they should use water only, and specify the most dangerous cases when 
they should use tear gas with certain restrictions (Personal Interview with a political 
scientist, March 2015) 
 Thereby a human rights' researcher admitted this fact by stating: 
The militarization is not likely to be lightened in the short term because it is 
entrenched in the Egyptian context on different levels, and the police are not an 
exception (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015) 
 However, a police officer insisted on the needed de-militarization especially in the 
context of the war on terror not only in terms of weapons and tools but also in terms 
of the philosophy behind the police work. He clarified: 
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We need to deal with the police from a civilian point of view; we need to declassify 
its historical documents and to make them accessible to researchers in order to 
analyze the reasons of the new terrorist wave (. . .) The learnt lesson from the 
terrorist wave in the eighties and nineties was that we could not solve the problem 
solely by force, we needed to launch intellectual revisions amongst the radicals' 
leadership in prisons (. . .) now we need to understand that the militarized police is 
not the solution, on the contrary we are losing more people every day (Personal 
Interview with an officer, February 2015)  
 One angle of a demilitarized police should be a clear break with the military 
tradition within the police, especially the police academy, and to transform the police 
to be more of a civil service rather than a police force. Nevertheless, the Police forces 
would still be an important actor in specific areas when breaking in and forcible 
arrests are needed. Yet, clear rules need to be put to differentiate the military and the 
police. As one officer explained:  
The police should be more civilian, it must have a clear break with the military 
traditions, it should be a civilian apparatus to better serve the people and get closer to 
them. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
One approach to civilianize the police is to change the education pattern within 
the police academy. As a researcher in security studies clarified:  
For me some points of the militarization should be changed, for instance the ranks 
within the police should be civilian, because you are training an officer to serve a 
civilian community, not to serve as a killing machine in the army. The police students 
could be living in dorms in the police academy but without being isolated from the 
society. The focal point is to break this isolation around the police academy. They 
might be recruited starting from age 17  to teach them the fighting arts, policing and 
law courses, but they should not be isolated in a way that would be negatively 
reflected on their interaction later with the people. (Personal Interview with a 
researcher in security studies, March 2015)  
 Another angle of the demilitarization is the abolition of the military conscripts' 
inclusion in the MOI under the Central Security Forces- CSF's authority. The CSF 
need to be restructured to recruit professional officers and soldiers, rather than 
receiving military conscripts from the Ministry of Defense. As one former officer 
explained: 
The MOI can recruit from ordinary people to build an anti-riot force, the recruitment 
criteria might include essential education only or a degree in sports or fitness and 
then train them to be better and educate them about how to deal with protests and 
riots … But this process should be an intentional recruitment not as military duty. A 
one hundred well trained and well equipped professional officers would eventually 
succeed to disperse protest without any fatal injury, rather than 4 thousands who 
know nothing… it is not an innovation, it is adopted everywhere in the world, the 
professional anti-riot forces will be better because they are trained  daily on anti-riots 
techniques. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015) 
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 Another officer has strongly emphasized the same logic:   
I would prefer to have like 50 thousands well trained officers in an anti-riot agency 
than having a 200 thousands poorly trained soldiers serving their military duty. 
(Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015) 
 Despite the importance of this step, it could not be easily applied in the short term, 
as one officer clarified:  
It is extremely necessary and extremely difficult in the same time. It could take 10 
years to be successfully implemented. Because you have to carefully plan for it, in 
terms of costs and training to prepare physically and intellectually qualified and 
professional cadres. Now the CSF solider may cost 100 LE per month, the officer 
who should replace him could cost 1200 LE at least per month if not more, So it is 
almost times 10 in terms of financial costs without mentioning the training and the 
education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
 However, another officer seemed skeptical about this step, requesting not only to 
maintain the military conscripts' inclusion in the MOI, but also to higher their level to 
be similar to those included in the Armed Forces. 
We need soldiers of a better quality, instead of a bad soldier serving for three years; I 
would prefer a good soldier who received high education to serve for only one year. 
We need the soldiers of the military, who are university graduates, they are extremely 
competent and they deal decently with the people. If this kind was allocated to serve 
in the police, it will definitely change the level of service because they understand, 
they actually use their minds, this way the State's budget will not be burdened with 
extra costs, the military will just direct some of the good quality soldiers to the 
police. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
 Nevertheless, this suggestion was widely refuted by almost all of the other 
interviewees. Some of them refused to drain the good quality soldiers from the armed 
forces to the police, while the others refused to emphasize the nature of the militarized 
police by including the good quality of military conscripts into the MOI. As a former 
officer argued: 
We should rather think to recruit university graduates in the police as full officers not 
as military conscripts, because frankly what is the difference between a commerce 
school graduate or a law school graduate and the police academy graduate? They 
should all be on the same level and recruited for the same degree which is officers 
not anything lower than that. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 
2015) 
C. Professionalism  
The MOI is in deep need of a multiplicity of reforms on the professional level, 
especially in terms of the doctrinal, managerial and technical dimensions. It was 
almost consensual amongst the interviewees that the MOI should not only halt its 
interference in political issues, but it should also shift its structures to permanently 
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disregard the non security tasks that are burdening its agenda. As one political 
scientist emphasized:  
We need to lift the political burden off the MOI, so it can focus only on the security 
tasks. Thus all the security representatives who are spread in the Egyptian 
bureaucracy should be withdrawn and replaced by political civilian officials 
(Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)   
 Accordingly, an officer suggested that this withdrawal should be more 
institutionalized by splitting the MOI into two ministries with completely separate 
bureaucracies and leaderships. He elaborated as follows:   
We should have two ministries instead of the MOI, one for managing the internal 
affairs and the other for only managing the security and the police work. So the 
Internal Affairs Ministry would manage all the civilian files related to serving the 
people such as civilian records, passports authorities and voters' records and so on, 
then the police work should be separate, and run by the Security and Safety Ministry. 
For, centralizing lots of tasks in the hands of the MOI permits it to control many files 
for despotic purposes, and as a result the police officers are burdened with lots of 
paper works that could be done by any civilian employee. (Personal Interview with a 
police officer, February 2015)  
Within the same structural scope, some interviewees agreed to transfer the 
National Security Agency- NSA (previously known as State Security Investigations- 
SSI) to the intelligence agencies to be directly affiliated to the president rather than 
the MOI. The main argument for those interviewees was to avoid any potential 
deviation of the MOI to renew its involvement in the political affairs. Moreover, the 
aim was to stop the influence exercised by the NSA on the whole work of police for 
State security reasons and allow the room for the police to rather focus on the human 
security and the public safety.  As one political scientist clarified: 
There is no country in the world without a department for state security or an internal 
intelligence. In all consolidated democracies, there is an agency playing this role. We 
should not be against the existence of this agency; we should be against its bad 
performance, its deviated doctrine and its impunity. It should work on the internal 
affairs and report about that to the decisions makers in full respect of the law and the 
democratic standards. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)   
A former officer added to that:  
I think this will be good for the NSA itself, but what is really important is to clearly 
define the relation between the agency and the other state institutions to guarantee a 
better performance and to monitor any potential deviation. (Telephone Interview with 
a former officer, February 2015) 
Accordingly, another former officer emphasized:  
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The whole process in forming this new agency should be completely managed 
outside of the MOI, yet a coordination comity is highly needed to link the NSA with 
the MOI and other security and intelligence agencies in full harmony. (Telephone 
Interview with a former officer, March 2015) 
On the other side, a substantial part of the interviewees refused this 
suggestion, since it could add to the NSA's power and leverage on the political 
scene without really adding anything to its accountability. As one human 
rights activist explained:  
This fact could add to the NSA's power and shed a new blackout on its activity, like 
the one already shed on the intelligence agencies; this could result in more difficulty 
when dealing with its accountability (Telephone Interview with a human rights 
activist, February 2015) 
However, an officer clarified the bottom line in this matter by stating: 
It should be controlled, whether it was a part of the MOI or elsewhere, but the 
affiliation does not really matter, what matters are its authorities and precise tasks 
assigned to it. For instance it could be transferred to work under the label of the 
intelligence, but if it works the same way, we will have no difference. If it is insisting 
on giving instructions in everything, in appointing the professor of university and the 
imam of the mosque, we got nothing new. The people do not really care if it is a part 
of the MOI or any other institution, the most important is what it is really doing. If 
you are saying so to weaken the MOI or to loosen its authority, let me tell you this 
was already done when the MOI collapsed in 2011, so no need to think this way. 
(Telephone Interview with a police officer, February 2015) 
  On the managerial level, the MOI needs clearly articulated rules to run its 
diverse departments. As an officer highlighted: 
The MOI needs essential, clear and stable rules that cannot be broken and should be 
applied on all no matter who they are. Then you will find the whole MOI functioning 
perfectly and there will be no wrongdoing, because honestly, the corruption, the 
nepotism and the intellectual stagnation are all as dangerous as the brutality on the 
police legitimacy. (Telephone Interview with a police officer, March 2015) 
Considering the same angle, other managerial reforms should be introduced, as one 
political scientist clarified:  
The promotion criteria should be linked to their performance rates not only to their 
seniority. The circulation policy between different specializations and regions needs 
to be revised. I do not understand why insisting on the circulation on the expense of 
the accumulation of knowledge in a specific field? A professional police should be 
specialized and accumulating knowledge. (Personal Interview with a political 
scientist, March 2015)  
  The second dimension of the professionalism is the doctrinal reform. The 
police in Egypt should reform its doctrine, first to better respect the law and the 
human rights, and secondly, to embrace new work styles and to rely on soft skills and 
quality as much as on hard skills and quantity. Within the first scope, the theoretical 
education of human rights courses whether in the under graduation curricula or the 
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post graduation training should be altered. A more practical approach should guide 
this education process, as a political scientist suggested:   
In order to teach them human rights properly you need some materials applied to 
their own work, inspired by the situations they face daily, to be able to  
psychologically convince them  and to gain their support to the spirit of the human 
rights. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)  
 Then within the second scope, a large diversification of the police academy 
curricula is needed. As one political science scholar highlighted:  
The police academy needs change, in terms of courses, instructors and techniques of 
education. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)  
Adding to that, an officer described what they need to learn in the academy as 
follows: 
They should make good use of the time we spend in the academy to teach us the 
skills that we really need, rather that teaching us other courses that are not useful in 
our daily work. For example, the negotiations skills and the interrogations 
techniques are almost absent in the academy curricula, we only pass through them 
very quickly as theoretical points in police courses. We need also to be trained on 
new technology to better solve cases. (Telephone interview with a police officer, 
March 2015) 
 
 
Another officer pointed to the long duration of schooling in the academy and 
suggested to shorten it by accepting university graduates in the police academy, rather 
than high school graduates: 
The police academy should accept the law school graduates to teach them the 
policing courses and the physical fitness courses, there is no need for full four years 
of education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
A former officer suggested a new mechanism for recruiting candidates to join the 
police academy in order to make sure that the selected candidates are perfectly fitting 
the job: 
The recruitment comity in the police academy should be composed of experts from 
different academic backgrounds such as policing, law, psychology and sociology to 
accurately choose those who really fit for the police job in terms of physical 
capacities and personality traits. The enrollment of the officers' sons in the academy 
is almost becoming a rule, which deprives the academy from other candidates who 
could be perfect for the job. Hence, we should freeze the enrollment of the officers' 
son for around five years in order to set a new rule in accepting the perfect candidates 
based on their capacities not on their family connections. (Telephone interview with 
a former officer, March 2015)  
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Another officer emphasized the need to change the recruiting criteria to enroll a 
better quality of candidates that would possibly well receive the new curricula of the 
academy:   
We can ensure a better performance if we applied new mechanisms of recruitment to 
enroll officers with good morals, then train them in a professional way and feed their 
souls with good values to make them driven by noble philosophy. It is not the 
responsibility of the police that the people have no conscience in some cases, it is a 
disease in the whole community, but it is the responsibility of the academy to teach 
them good manners and noble values to minimize their tendency for deviation. We 
might not be able to test them in terms of values and convictions like we test them 
physically and medically but we can teach them all these values within the academy. 
(Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
This need for ethical and moral orientation in the academy has been also 
emphasized by a former officer when he contrasted what he was taught in the 
academy with what was taught to his late father, who was also an officer. 
He used to teach me what he learnt in the academy in the sixties, he used to tell me 
do not ever try to forge a case, do not ever beat a suspect to force him to confess, the 
good officer is the one who solves the case with his own intelligence, the torture is 
the tool of incompetent officers, use your mind not your hand or weapons, these were 
the ethics of the old generation of officers, but what we learnt in the academy was 
completely the opposite, these ethics should be taught in the academy instead of the 
arrogant discourse that they teach nowadays. (Telephone Interview with a former 
officer, February 2015)      
Besides, a strong reliance on new methods and work techniques should be put 
forward in any potential plan of reform. Yet, there was a divergence around if these 
new methods would necessitate new resources or only new allocation of the already 
existing resources. One officer highlighted the importance of increasing the MOI's 
share of the state budget to deliver a better security service:  
Just give us more money and you will get a better security service, with more money 
we can buy a new technology to enhance the communication system between the 
police stations and the 122 emergency call center, a new technology to enhance the 
internal communication system of wireless voice network and to make it covering the 
whole country, a new technology to better protect the police vehicles, a new 
technology to equip the patrol forces with laptops or tablets directly connected to 
every directorate in order to check on the suspects' criminal records without arresting 
them and transferring them to the police station. (Telephone Interview with an 
officer, February 2015) 
However, a former officer considered that the MOI is not serious about applying 
new technology arguing that the problem is not lacking funds, it is rather lacking the 
will to change the old methods. He elaborated: 
If the MOI has 1 billion pounds to purchase equipments, it would rather spend it on 
weapons, masks, uniforms, bulletproof vests and shoes. It would totally ignore that it 
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could purchase with the same amount of money surveillance cameras, computers, 
monitors, simulators, soft skills training such as psychological analysis and so on. 
The problem is in the mindset which tends to increase weapons on the expense of 
other needed soft technology, hence reflecting the state inclination towards coercion 
rather than negotiations and dialogue. It simply prefers to use the muscles over the 
mind. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015) 
This mindset problem was described by an officer by stating: 
They have to understand that new equipments do not equal new weapons. (Personal 
Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
Another officer added to this regard: 
What we need the most is to apply a scientific method in criminal investigation and 
to generously invest in equipment and training to reach this goal. (Telephone 
Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
Similarly, a journalist briefed this issue by stating: 
They cannot even imagine that the machines can do better in some cases than 
exhausted personnel. But again if we think about the exhausted personnel, we can 
receive extraordinary results with little change on the organizational and managerial 
level, when we just improve their conditions and think about them as human. 
(Personal Interview with a journalist specialized in human rights and security issues, 
March 2015)  
Accordingly a political scientist emphasized on the same matter with more 
elaboration: 
The problem is solved when they understand that the cameras are as important as the 
weapons… Then downsizing would be applicable in Egypt but first we have to 
enhance the quality of the forces so we can let some of them go, to increase the 
quality in order to decrease the quantity, to replace some personnel with cameras, 
computers, equipment, and data analysis applications. (Personal interview with a 
political scientist, March 2015)  
The issue of downsizing is extremely important when aiming at transforming the 
police into a more effective force. But the downsizing could be quite controversial if 
we consider the constant complaint of the officers from the big work load and the 
extended working hours. As one officer describe this problem: 
When I get my fair amount of working hours and I leave to home, there is no officer 
to replace me; we definitely need to increase the numbers of the officers. In 
Alexandria for instance, the total police service consists of 1100-1200 officers in all 
departments, we need to at least double this number. (Telephone Interview with an 
officer, February 2015) 
Thereby, a security studies' researcher tried to solve this downsizing dilemma by 
highlighting the following:  
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Anyone with basic knowledge in police reform that might come to advice the MOI 
will right away advice them on increasing the numbers of officers and decreasing the 
numbers of sub-officers. (Personal Interview with a researcher in security studies, 
March 2015) 
In this matter, the vetting process could be particularly important to guide the 
downsizing and the selective recruitment processes. As one human rights' researcher 
explained it: 
The vetting is a tool for gradual change and democratization, not a mere purge. It is 
a long objective and not personalized process, where the rights of the personnel are 
preserved, it involves an administrative mechanism for selection not a criminal 
prosecution, according to which we can decide who should continue in his job, who 
should be promoted or removed, and even those who are removed would be 
compensated and have a retirement package. The vetting process is really 
complicated but to manage it successfully, we need to access the database of the 
MOI and its personnel's records, in order to accurately make the right decision. 
(Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)  
Moreover, the downsizing is crucial if we considered that most of the MOI's budget 
is directed to salaries payment, thus, a substantial decrease in the personnel would 
positively impact the possibility of purchasing new equipment and including new 
technology. Yet this matter would not be possible if we do not put forward an effective 
auditing system to control the financial department within the MOI.  
What I need as a reform is to honestly and adequately manage the finances of the 
MOI and to direct the surplus in this regard to purchase new technical assistance 
tools such as forensic medicine tools and criminal analysis laboratories. Then after 
that we should think about improving the officers' salaries and working conditions. I 
can wait longer for a raise in my salary but I cannot tolerate that the money is 
wasted on huge payments for the high ranking colonels, rather than purchasing 
useful tools to enhance our work. (Email interview with an officer, February 2015)   
 
A similar stance was presented by another officer as follows: 
I think that number one priority for resources allocation in the MOI today should be 
for the bomb disposal officers who might risk their lives to save ours, they need to get 
the best equipment and training in this regard, no matter how match it would cost. 
(Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)   
Another officer pointed to the financial management of the MOI's resources from 
a different angle by stating: 
Step number one in countering corruption and bribery on all ranking levels is to pay 
suitable salaries, I do not care how much would that be, but I need to be sure that it 
is a just reward for my work and that there is a general policy of equity in this 
regard, that means that everyone in my rank and doing the same job are equally 
rewarded, and that the high ranking colonels are not receiving exaggerated salaries. 
(Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)  
A firm counter corruption policy is very much needed to rationalize the public 
spending, to decrease the salaries' disparities and to improve the officers' motivation 
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to better fulfill their jobs. One angle to approach this policy is to modernize the 
police tools, as a political scientist stated: 
Countering corruption is a substantial part of the police reform, the more you 
modernize the police tools the more difficult the corruption will be, because every 
wrongdoing and misconduct could easily be tracked and then punished. (Personal 
interview with a political science scholar, March 2015) 
A second angle to approach a counter corruption policy is to set a firm 
transparency policy introduced through a clear law, as a former officer described it:  
We need a special law to protect the officers who want to report on the corruption 
and the nepotism of their superiors, because there are plenty of them but they are 
afraid of potential punishment if they exposed the corruption. (Telephone interview 
with a former officer, March 2015)  
Moreover, an important complementary measure to promote transparency and 
counter corruption is the protection of the whistle blowers within the police apparatus. 
Therefore, it is important to allow the formation of the police unions in order to serve 
as a legal medium to bridge the gap with people and a platform for the officers to 
channel their views. As one political scientist put it: 
We need it as a feedback mechanism, for both sides, for the citizens to evaluate their 
interaction with the police, and for the officers who need to channel their complaints 
without fearing to be punished by their superiors for revealing the work deficiencies. 
(Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015) 
Another important input to help designing an effective security policy was put 
forward by a sociologist, as follows:  
We need to initiate a new apparatus within the MOI to be dedicated to the futuristic 
studies, to do research about the prospects of crimes and the new solutions that might 
serve the police work, this would recruit some researchers like anthropologists and 
officers with field experience to design plans and strategies for police work, this type 
of studies would be important to inform the security policy from a sold scientific 
background so it would be a knowledge based policy… or at least the MOI should 
engage in partnerships with the NGOs and the Universities in order to produce this 
type of studies. (Personal interview with a sociologist, March 2015) 
The problem as articulated by an officer is not the lack of scientific knowledge 
within the MOI; rather it is the lack of political will to put this knowledge into action 
and to design effective policies 
There is a plenty of studies produced in police training courses and master's and PhD 
degrees suggesting many patterns of reforming the MOI. The solution is in the 
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scientific approach, all what we need is a serious will to implement all these 
accumulated studies. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015) 
Another officer has gone further to request wider cooperation with international 
partners to learn about other experiences in improving the police performance 
whether on the soft training or on the high technology and equipment levels (Personal 
interview with an officer, February 2015). Yet, again all these measures need a strong 
political will to be accurately implemented.     
D. Accountability 
Almost the entire sample agreed to introduce several levels and mechanisms of 
oversight on the police work. The police officers agreed to be subject to external 
oversight mechanisms with one condition, which is preserving their rights and 
providing them with adequate working techniques and tools. On the other hand, the 
human rights experts and researchers emphasized the role of the internal control 
authority within the MOI as an important mechanism to correct the potential 
deviation of the police. Then the external mechanisms of oversight would come as a 
second option to complement the internal control and suggest better policies to 
enhance the police performance. As one political scientist put it: 
If the internal control authority is serious about making the police more accountable, 
they should plan for that rather than just hiring a high ranking colonel to justify the 
police abuses or deny their occurrence. For instance, the internal control should 
announce that the police abuse cases were around 90 in 2014, but new mechanisms 
would be introduced to reduce this number to only 45 the next year, then 20 the 
following year and so on. These mechanisms could be like new training, new 
performance evaluation templates, and new incentives for police chefs to report about 
their wrongdoing subordinates. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 
2015) 
An officer agreed to consolidate the work of the internal control and added to that: 
We need to dismantle the nepotism network that might protect the misconduct and 
also to protect and reward the honest officers who refuse to execute the deviated 
commands of their superiors and insist on exposing their wrongdoing. (Telephone 
interview with an officer, February 2015) 
 
A human rights' activist emphasized the need to constantly assess the police 
performance whether on the criminal or on the conduct levels 
The officers' performance should be constantly rated to reward the ethical and 
effective officers, and punish the abusers and lazy officers; such a mechanism should 
enhance the general police performance and minimize the potential wrongdoing. 
(Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 2015) 
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A strong judicial oversight on the police work would definitely promote the police 
reform. Yet, it must go hand in hand with a general reform in the justice system that 
should include the judiciary, the prosecutors and the ministry of justice (Personal 
interview with a political scientist, March 2015). A police officer has precisely 
emphasized this matter by stating: 
I can only trust the judges and the prosecutors in overseeing my work if they are 
truly abided by the law and do not seek to only hold me accountable for the sake of 
the superiority of their own profession over mine, the law should simply rule over 
us all. (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015)    
 
The judicial oversight might promote police accountability through civil litigation 
if the police would be obliged to financially compensate every victim that was 
abused at the hands of the police (Telephone interview with an officer, February 
2015). Moreover, the prosecutors should activate their original prerogatives in 
checking on the detention cells, making sure that every detainee is legally registered 
in the police station records and that the detainees are receiving adequate health care 
and are not subjected to torture or any type of abuse. Adding to that, a special 
judicial comity should be initiated to review all the violence incidents where firearms 
were used by the police to evaluate if the firearms' use was indispensable and the 
police were really at risk (Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 
2015). This step would request some legal revisions to accurately specify the 
situations where police can use firearms and where they should use other non lethal 
tools instead (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015). 
Moreover, a human rights expert suggested the need for initiating a new post of an 
investigative judge to precede the work of the public prosecutor. Thus, the authority 
to investigate a case, assigned to the investigative judge, would be separated from the 
authority to file an accusation, assigned to the public prosecutor. Such a 
diversification would eventually assure more equity to the justice system and narrow 
the police authority in manipulating and avoiding the prosecutor oversight over their 
work (Personal interview with a human rights' expert, March 2015)  
A former officer suggested granting the authority of visiting the detention cells to 
the human rights NGOs' representatives to check on the police respect of human 
conditions for the detainees.  
The police officers would be better protected from false claims of violations and 
abuses if each police station was under tight observation, conducted by human rights 
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NGOs or some notable figures in the local community to check on the respect of the 
detainees' rights. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015) 
Accordingly a human rights expert emphasized this mechanism as one of the 
important tools of parliamentarian oversight in this regard. 
A special comity within the parliament should have the authority to conduct 
unpredicted visits to detention places. (Personal interview with a human rights 
expert, March 2015) 
Nevertheless, a political scientist disagreed with this view, requesting the public 
prosecutors to preserve this authority and the parliamentarians to exercise another type 
of oversight. 
The political accountability should not be exercised by a parliamentarian comity 
which conducts visits to different prisons; those parliamentarians could easily be 
deceived and would probably not understand the tricks of the police in hiding the 
abuses. And also in young democracies where the authority is not well 
institutionalized, that could open the door for nepotism, clientelism and exchanged 
interests. So the parliament should practice a political oversight not a 
technical/professional one. That is why the internal control is important because 
they actually understand the details and technicalities of the police work. The 
political oversight should be practiced on the minister of Interior, to discuss a 
reform plan, to legislate a new law not to visit the prisons or the police stations. 
(Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)  
Adding to that, several officers have emphasized the role of the parliamentarian 
oversight as a tool to investigate any complaint by a police officer who faced injustice 
by the internal inspection and control authority within the MOI. As one officer put it:  
I need a parliamentarian oversight to protect me if the internal control authority was 
tough on me; I mean we need an external oversight to watch the internal overseers of 
the police work. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)   
However another officer was suspicious about the competence of the parliament in 
overseeing the police work arguing that the parliamentarians might lack the needed 
technical expertise to do this job. Thus an oversight conducted by the judiciary or the 
executive body would be more welcomed by the police (Email Interview with a police 
officer, February 2015) 
Here comes the importance of initiating a new body with both judicial and 
executive authorities to oversee the police work. The ombudsman was initiated in 
many countries as a mixed authority capable of overseeing the police. Its task 
consisted of transferring the criminal wrongdoing to courts, advising the police 
leadership on the needed reforms and recommending new legislative amendments to 
the parliament. Such a body if initiated in Egypt, would get some of the public 
prosecutors' authority in investigating cases with special focus on human rights abuses 
and misconduct done by the police. However, it would definitely be an added value in 
promoting the human rights culture and the legal knowledge amongst Egyptians. Some 
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of the interviewees refuted the need for initiating a new body arguing that the work of 
the prosecutors would be sufficient if properly activated.  Nevertheless, the other part 
has welcomed the initiation of the ombudsman institution since all the people needed 
to enhance their human rights culture, whether they were regular citizens or police 
officers.  
A human rights researcher emphasized the context of initiating this new body as 
follows: 
If there is a serious political will, an ombudsman should be put in place with wide 
prerogatives to oversee the police work. Yet, if the political will is absent, all 
attempts to form new oversight bodies would be superficial and merely a new façade 
for old deviated practices. (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 
2015) 
Adding to that, a former officer stressed on the founding criteria for creating this 
new body: 
The inspectors of this body should be carefully chosen from the police and 
the prosecutors' body, to ensure that the nepotism culture is not entrenched 
in their mindset; otherwise the whole experience would fail. (Telephone 
interview with a former officer, February 2015) 
An officer has also emphasized the role of the media and the civil society in 
promoting a good legal knowledge and human rights culture in society. He had also 
requested the civil society to address the police officers with these legal knowledge 
promotion campaigns because a big portion of officers might have deficiencies as well 
in this regard (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015). In addition, a 
human rights' researcher suggested a wide campaign of oversight conducted by the 
civil society especially through the new media to map the police abuses in order to 
hold them accountable later on. He elaborated on that matter as follows: 
The oversight mechanisms applied through the anonymity of the social media is 
extremely crucial when the political regime is closed and unfriendly with 
accountability mechanisms. The civil society has been consecutively targeted for 
trying to expose the police abuses. However, doing the same mission via social media 
and cyber space at large could lower the costs of challenging the MOI's extended 
powers. We should conduct a mapping of all police stations where abuses and torture 
are taking place in order to spread the knowledge and keep track of the human rights 
violators within the police body. We would need this map later to prosecute the 
abusers if we witnessed a political opening or to protect the honest officers if we 
witnessed a moment of total collapse and violence against the police. (Personal 
Interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015) 
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VIII- Conclusion 
This study aimed at exploring the management of the police reform in the 
changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 2015. It also aimed at 
assessing the degree to which democratic policing norms such as political neutrality, 
professionalism, de-militarization, and accountability were applied. It then suggested 
some strategies of reforms that could be applied in the Egyptian context to promote 
democratic policing. Relying on a sample of only 22 in-depth interviews this study 
has substantial limitations. Thus, its results cannot be subjected to any generalization. 
They could merely serve as a preliminary assessment of the police officers and 
human rights advocates' insights about police reform, taking into consideration the 
limitation of the sample.  
One of the main findings of this research was that the police reform is tightly linked 
to the political environment, especially in the moments of political change. In other 
words, the police reform defined by its four main democratic policing norms is usually 
promoted when the regime in a changing political environment tends to democratize. 
Moreover, police reform is usually one part of several reform cycles that a specifi c 
political regime undergoes when transforming from an authoritarian to a democratic 
regime. Such a remark was quite obvious when exploring the experiences of police 
reform in Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. In Brazil, the police was reformed 
on gradual basis following strong security crises that obliged the political leaders to 
decide to reform and the security actors to design and implement this reform. But in 
Turkey, the police tended to reform as a respond to political pressure put on Turkey to 
be more abided by democratic standards to prepare for the European Union accession. 
In the case of Poland, the police reform was a substantial part of a wider trend of 
political transformation that took place in the country based on a negotiated transition 
with the communist regime. Thus, the door was open to many cycles of alternation to 
power that have impacted the legislations regulating the police work. Similarly in 
South Africa, the negotiated plan of police reform was part of a general political 
transformation following the conclusion of the apartheid. In all cases of changing 
political environment whether it was gradual on the long term or comprehensive on 
the short-term, the progress of the police reform was positively related to the general 
progress in the democratic change. Thus, the police reform was triggered by major 
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security crises that yielded popular protests then a general opening in the political 
regime. Therefore, the design of the reform process was the joint effort of a diversity 
of actors such as political actors, human rights advocates, professional unions and 
bureaucratic cadres. Moreover, in the cases where certain external actors were 
involved, such as in Poland for instance, the reform was quite successful and integral.  
However, assessing the success of the police reform is always relative considering 
the general political context. Thus, according to the four democratic policing norms, 
some of the four cases might not be a flagrant model of reform success. For instance, 
Turkey has deficiencies when it comes to the demilitarization. So is Brazil when it 
comes to the political neutrality and also South Africa when it comes to accountability. 
Therefore, the police reform is quite relative and does not consist of a universal 
formula that could apply easily in any place in the world. It is rather a tailored plan 
that should involve a variety of stakeholders but should be first endorsed by a firm 
political will.  
Therefore, when tackling the Egyptian case, this study focused on assessing the 
extent of the introduced reforms under each of the four defining norms of democratic 
policing. Certainly, some angles of reform such as demilitarization and political 
neutrality failed to meet the theoretical standards in this regards. However, the 
professionalism and the accountability marked some positive reforms that should serve 
as solid basis for any future reform in Egypt. Yet, they are not sufficient to judge the 
Egyptian case of police reform as successful. Thereby, also in Egypt, the political 
environment matters since the reform is a political choice that requires a substantial 
consensus and a political will. After four years of the Egyptian Revolution, several 
opportunities for building such a consensus were not properly materialized. This fact 
has deeply impacted the extent of the introduced reform and has reduced it to 
incremental positive steps especially in the professionalism and the accountability 
angles. However, these steps could not stand as a real reform since they failed to 
change the nature of the police.  
Indeed, the research tried to explore the possibility of passing some professional 
reforms in the police without necessarily introducing similar steps in the 
accountability, the political neutrality and the demilitarization dimensions. However, 
the applicability of this attempt was refuted by almost all of the interviewees, based on 
the assumption that a holistic reform would be more effective. Yet, we missed the 
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opportunity of applying a comprehensive reform following the 2011 revolution as it 
was the case in Poland. Considering the Brazilian case, Egypt still has the chance to 
invest in police reform if emerged a serious series of security crises. In this regard, 
Brazil stands as a model where strong oversight measures applied by the civil society 
targeting accountability programs turned to be integrated programs of partnership with 
the police departments to boost their professionalism. This idea of building partnership 
between the police and the civil society was frequently tackled by most of the 
interviewees whether under the professionalism or the accountability angles. Yet, the 
police culture stands an impediment to properly invest in this partnership approach. 
Despite, the wide common ground between the insights of police officers and human 
rights advocates regarding the reform, mutual trust needed to invest in partnership is 
still missing. Most of the police officers who agreed to conduct the interviews were at 
first suspicious about the outsider who wants to investigate about their job conditions. 
However, at the end of each interview a certain level of trust was built between us. 
Thus, their perception about this type of studies turned gradually to be positive.   
Taking into consideration the limitation of the sample, this study tries to present an 
Egyptian formula for police reform based on the common ground between the views 
of police officers and human rights advocates. First, police reform is not an isolated 
aspect of the wider picture of a democratic political environment. Thus, an effective 
police reform is almost impossible without a wider circle of reform targeting the state 
bureaucracy, the justice system and the parliamentarian authority.  Hence, the 
interdependency between the police work and the justice system requires a parallel 
reform process conducted in all of the institutions in question. Moreover, such 
interdependency is quite applicable to the relationship between the four norms of 
democratic policing. Boosting the police professionalism without pushing for more 
accountability mechanisms would not result in an effective reform. Yet, the most 
important is that the political neutrality is the solid key that could decide on the 
prospects of the reform process altogether. Similar to that is the demilitarization, 
because it reflects the general balance of power and the civil military relations in a 
certain country. Therefore, unless there are substantial improvements in political 
neutrality and demilitarization, police reform could not be materialized. It is also 
important to highlight that some aspects of the demilitarization should be addressed on 
the long term. Therefore, some aspects of the police reform could be postponed or 
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scheduled on the long term. Yet, the political will for planning and implementing the 
reform agenda on a holistic and a comprehensive basis should be clearly stated before 
starting the reform.  
On the other hand, the professionalism angle is quite important, especially on the 
doctrinal level, where a diversification of the police education inputs should be 
introduced. Additionally, a more rational allocation of the police resources should 
guide the spending towards purchasing new working tools and soft applications as 
much as purchasing new weapons and hard equipments. Concerning the accountability  
angle, it should be tackled as a comprehensive map of mechanisms that complement 
each other. Thus, an effective accountability does not consist of separated obsolete 
bodies. Rather, it consists of an integrated map of checks and balances, in which each 
institution is fully abided by the law. And in this regard, ending the dominance of the 
executive over the judiciary and the legislative bodies, is crucial, as well as, promoting 
the freedom of expression for media outlets. This fact obviously recalls the 
intertwining of an effective police reform and a general democratic political 
environment. Yet, until a clear political will is introduced, the civil society still has a 
bunch of scattered opportunities to build a wider popular demand for police reform. 
Promoting human rights culture through media outlets and civil society organizations 
is one option to building this demand. Constant exposing of police brutalities and 
security failures is another option. And approaching police officers themselves with an 
appealing discourse of human rights promotion is a third option, in order to widen the 
cycle of reformists within the police apparatus.  
Resting on all of the above, extensive studies on democratic policing should be 
conducted in order to investigate further aspects of reform. And in this regard, the 
organizational culture change within the police should be prioritized, along with legal 
and administrative channels for promoting police accountability.           
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